

Constraints in Implementing Decentralisation in Zambia

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Abstract

Purpose: Against a backdrop of Zambia's continued weak economic conditions and with many local authorities, experiencing declining local revenues and financial performance, this paper presents a synthesis of the local government turnaround findings. It aims to identify the constraints to decentralization and recovery strategies based on the evidence provided by pragmatic research.

Design/methodology/approach: The study 120 questionnaires distributed via online to all 120 respondents using purposive and critical case sampling. The study created and deployed the questionnaire using free online software (kobotoolbox) to the 120 critical case and purposively selected respondents. Out of 120 respondents 103 responded creating a survey response rate of above 85%.

Findings: Major constraints in implementing decentralization included: continued delay to release decentralized functions by central government, lack of political will from central government, failure to implement the agreed decentralized structure by central government, failure to relinquish some revenue streams to local authorities, governments unclear policy guidance on decentralization, lack of a standardized system as well as a monitoring mechanism, and failure to generate adequate own revenue by local authorities.

Research implications: This research assumes a significant role in formulation of policy for local government tier and provide a basis for further research in this area as well as designing policies for an improved local government fiscal system.

Practical implications: this study adds pragmatic perspectives towards resolving revenue problems faced by Zambia's local authorities.

Originality/value: This paper compiles facts and offers practitioners an evidence-based view through investigating Zambia's local government economic structure, analyzing forces underlying them and examining their consequential cultural interplay.

Keywords: Decentralization; Local Authority; Local Revenue

1.0 Introduction

Zambia has already embarked on development strategies that emphasize decentralization makes the decentralization theory more suitable and appropriate for this study. The theoretical argument for decentralization traces back to the belief that people at local level must have the mandate to compose independent regions to which they respectively belong and effectively avoid the dangers of central government control (Diep, Archer and Gueye, 2016). The early propositions in decentralization theory were only on political representation such as the Stigler's theory of decentralization, which identifies two principles in its design (Fatile & Ejalonibu, 2015): (1) keeping authority and control closer to the grass roots through local authorities (2) people right to participate in deciding and identifying their needs. The modern day decentralization theories, which emphasize democratic principles and functional performances. The theory of decentralization explains the transfer of authority and responsibility from the central government to the subordinate government entities or the private sector (Fatile & Ejalonibu, 2015; Wild, Chambers, King and Harris, 2012).

Decentralization is a global trend, which fosters better understanding between citizens and the officials through community participation in government affairs and enables people to participate more directly in governance process (Sikander, 2015). Decentralization is an initiative to support and give functions and responsibilities to the lower tiers of government for efficient and effective service delivery. Decentralization, as a framework for development, guarantees resources and greater autonomy in administrative decision-making in local authority. This strengthens democratic accountability and ensures that the government responds timely to the specific needs of communities. Decentralization is a measure of central government's increasing willingness to grant more financial autonomy to local governments (Saito, 1999).

Another initiative to mitigate poor service delivery across the public service sector is decentralization of certain functions from central to local government (Curristine et al, 2007). However, the objectives, and the strategy for implementation, must be clear, hence, there is a need to incorporate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms into the process of provision of quality public infrastructure services as part of an attempt to enhance public participation in the delivery of public services countrywide (Tshukudu, 2014; Mafema et al, 2014). Nonetheless, most literature proves a strong, unconditional, and positive relationship between decentralization and accountability whilst noting that decentralization will not be successful unless there is also simplifying of business processes, revamping human resource management policies, and establishing credible and effective accountability mechanisms (Husain, 2012). Fiscal decentralization hinders public service delivery when accountability is loose as local governments are tempted to allocate higher decentralized expenditure to wages and goods and services instead of capital expenditure (Sow and Razafimahefa, 2015). It is apparently clear that the Government should not just develop but implement mechanisms to monitor local government projects based around improving community cohesion, public services and enterprise (Ilfiffe et al, 2014).

2.0 Decentralizing Governance

Decentralization generally refers to the transfer of some administrative and fiscal functions of central government to local authorities (Jong et al, 1999; Hammond & Tosun, 2009). Decentralisation has thus been the major policy issue across many African countries (Mohmand & Loureiro, 2017). Bardhan (2002) regards decentralization as a major institutional framework for China's remarkable industrial growth. He opines that the centralized system has lost legitimacy because of many failures as decentralization promises a wide range of benefits. It is regarded as a way to making central government more responsive, competent, well-organised and efficient though fragmentation of central authority, reduction of central government role and introducing more local authority responsivity and accountability (Ahmad & Abu Talib, 2011). Decentralization is a basis to improving community participation in a country's development (Nzimakwe & Pillay, 2014; Amusa & Mabugu, 2016; Sarmistha & Zaki, 2017).

In order to overcome physical and central government administrative constraints of the development agenda, it is widely regarded as necessary to transfer functions and power from central government to local authorities (Ahmad & Abu Talib, 2011). The context of decentralization reforms in which central governments transfer political, administrative, fiscal and economic powers and functions to local authorities has become an increasing method of pursuing participatory mechanisms in a bid to improve governance and service delivery "with respect to efficient allocation of resources, equity in service delivery, accountability and reduction of corruption, quality of services, and, cost recovery" (Muriu, 2013, p. 12). Hence, "governments have been increasingly encouraged to decentralize their activities and shift decision making to the local level in order to promote public participation, government accountability as well as responsiveness of public policies and service delivery" (Maschietto, 2016, p.103).

Though decentralized government is considered more "responsive towards local needs and development of poor peoples" the idea of decentralization may need some "protection against free market advocates who might attempt to use it to cripple the central government and those who ignore local authority failures" (Ahmad & Abu Talib, 2011, p. 58; Bardhan, 2002, p.185). However, decentralization is key to sustainable development since the fragmentation of functions and power at intergovernmental level improves the management of resources and participation of communities. However, several local government reforms

including decentralization remain incomplete and have had little impact on improved governance agenda (Mohmand and Loureiro, 2017) due to “central governments' inability to decentralise power and fiscal autonomy in the name of national unity and stability” (Oluwasinaayomi & Tunde, 2017, p.110). These failures have led to minimal participation of citizens and the “resulting influence on the decentralized service delivery negligible” “perpetuating existing challenges and limiting the ability of local authorities to address both current and future environmental, social and economic challenges” (Muriu, 2013, p.91; Diep et al, 2016, p.43).

Dickovick and Wunsch (2014) concluded that although the legal, fiscal, and administrative authorities can be increased in local authorities there can still be fewer achievements in other dimensions of governance, including autonomy, accountability, and capacity. This is mainly because central government is usually interested in retaining power, functions and revenue generating streams rather than redistributing to lower levels of government (Maschietto, 2016). Despite the assumption that decentralization would encourage local populace to be more “willing to participate and possibly be ready to pay taxes” study findings show that “decentralization policy suffer adverse financing constraints” and poor implementation strategies (Mushemeza, 2019, p.11). Decentralization, in most cases, is characterized by lack of or limited transfer of administrative authority, transfer of workload to local authorities while “decision-making in the functional areas remain largely centralized” (Mohammed et al, 2016, p.173). Martinez-Vazquez (2011) refers to this system as “deconcentration” in which workload or operations are transferred to lower levels of government, but fail to devolve decision-making powers thereby limiting benefits for providers. Therefore, each country must endeavor to learn country-specific ways to improve the model of implementation of fiscal decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez, 2011; Smoke, 2003).

On the other hand, Schneider (2019) argues that when decentralization lacks specificity it becomes an unreliable concept and appear to operate more as a rhetorical strategy. Mohammed (2016) tested the claim that decentralization increases public participation and decision making in local authorities and found evidence showed that contrary to theory, formal and informal procedures for participation are inadequate and irregular. He argues that decentralization cannot induce significant levels of public participation unless it addresses social, political and economic structure that inhibit engagement and empowerment of especially marginalized groups at the onset. Olum (2014, p.23) proposes six pre-conditions that need to be fulfilled prior to implementing decentralization and they include; “institutional mechanisms; creation of spaces for participation; political will and civil will; capacity development at the local level; careful implementation; and democratic governance”. Several shortcomings, such as “low levels of accountability, insufficient human and financial resources, corruption, patronage, and central resistance to decentralization, constrain the proper implementation of the reform, putting improvements in participation and efficiency at risk and ultimately jeopardizing the intended impact on poverty” (Steiner, 2006, p3; Green, 2008).

3.0 Research Methodology

The research adopted a critical case and purposeful arranged selection of local government staff for structured questionnaire. The procedure involved administering structured questionnaire on respondents. The study adopted purposive and critical case sampling because it required respondents with adequate knowledge of the fiscal nature of the local authority. The adoption of this approach ensured the selection of respondents with knowledge in the areas of revenue generation and expenditure in the Local Authority. In this study, the population referred to local authorities (represented by either town clerk or council secretary and or director). Therefore, the study identified a total finite population of 120 potential respondents; to generalize the research ensured that the purposive samples were representative.

4.0 Data Analysis

4.1 Descriptive statistics of the constraints in implementing decentralisation

The statements whose mean scores were greater than 3.5 (Table 1) were further tested for significance using the standard t-test (Table 2). It was established that seven (7) statements out of the fourteen (14) were statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. Tables 1 and 2 presents statistical test results.

4.2 Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) of the constraints in implementing decentralisation (General Linear Model)

The study performed a MANOVA on dependent variables (statements 5.6, 5.4, 5.13, 5.2, 5.14 and 5.12) as a function of statement 5.5 (**The government has failed to implement decentralisation structure**). All multivariate tests (Pillai's Trace, Wilks Lambda, Hotelling's Trace and Roy's Largest Root) rejected the null hypothesis ($p < 0.001$) (Table 3). This means that all MANOVA tests have proven that there is a statistical significance between the fixed variable and the dependent variables.

4.3 Univariate Tests

Table 4 provides us with univariate Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. These test the null hypothesis that there are no population mean differences of Statement 5.5 (S5.5) on each dependent variable considered separately. When performing the MANOVA, the research presumably wished to analyze a linear combination of response variables and also test each response variable univariately as follows (Table 4);

- i. When statement 5.2 (S5.2) is considered as the sole dependent variable, we have evidence of mean differences on statement 5.5 ($p = 0.000$).
- ii. When statement 5.4 (S5.4) is analyzed as the only dependent variable, we have evidence of mean differences on statement 5.5 ($p = 0.000$), etc.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the constraints in implementing decentralisation

Statement	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance	Skewness		Kurtosis		Mean Score > 3.5
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error	
5.6 Failure to relinquish some revenue streams to local authorities	103	4.30	0.81	0.66	-1.50	0.24	3.54	0.47	Yes
5.4 Continued delay to release decentralized function by central government	103	4.02	0.86	0.74	-0.78	0.24	0.65	0.47	Yes
5.5 Failure to implement the decentralization structure by government	103	3.95	0.82	0.67	-0.56	0.24	-0.02	0.47	Yes
5.13 Lack of standardized system as well as monitoring mechanism	103	3.69	1.03	1.06	-0.72	0.24	0.18	0.47	Yes
5.2 Lack of political will from central government	102	3.52	1.17	1.36	-0.54	0.24	-0.48	0.47	Yes
5.14 Failure to increase revenue collection in local authorities	103	3.49	1.04	1.08	-0.44	0.24	-0.31	0.47	Yes

5.12 Government's unclear policy guidance on decentralization	103	3.46	1.20	1.45	-0.46	0.24	-0.67	0.47	Yes
5.3 Lack of sensitization among stakeholders	103	3.45	1.00	0.99	-0.58	0.24	-0.16	0.47	No
5.9 Lack of autonomy in local authorities	102	3.32	1.10	1.21	-0.31	0.24	-0.60	0.47	No
5.8 Lack of adequate financial resources and skill set from central government	101	3.23	1.00	1.00	-0.17	0.24	-0.48	0.48	No
5.11 Failure to exhibit staff retention in local authorities	103	3.13	1.23	1.52	-0.28	0.24	-0.88	0.47	No
5.10 Failure to demonstrate ability to prudently account for resources in local authority	102	2.69	1.10	1.21	0.29	0.24	-0.59	0.47	No
5.1 Lack of implementation of circulars by local authorities	102	2.58	1.01	1.02	0.28	0.24	-0.21	0.47	No
5.7 Lack of capacity in local authorities to take up extra functions	103	2.33	1.14	1.30	0.65	0.24	-0.36	0.47	No

The Table shows statements whose mean scores were greater than 3.5. It was established that seven (7) statements out of the fourteen (14) had a mean score greater than 3.5 and there were investigated further for significance using the standard t-test. The data shows that for example the failure to relinquish some revenue streams to local authorities by central government is a major contributing factor to the failure to implement decentralisation in Zambia.

Table 2: Standard t-test results for constraints in implementing decentralisation

Statement	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						Lower	Upper
Lack of political will from central government	30.470	101	0.00	3.5196	0.1155	3.290	3.749
Continued delay to release decentralised function by central government	47.270	102	0.00	4.0194	0.0850	3.851	4.188
Failure to implement the decentralisation structure by	48.845	102	0.00	3.9515	0.0809	3.791	4.112

government							
Failure to relinquish some revenue streams to local authorities	53.590	102	0.00	4.3010	0.0803	4.142	4.460
Government's unclear policy guidance on decentralisation	29.165	102	0.00	3.4563	0.1185	3.221	3.691
Lack of standardised system as well as monitoring mechanism	36.378	102	0.00	3.6893	0.1014	3.488	3.890
Failure to increase revenue collection in local authorities	34.105	102	0.00	3.4854	0.1022	3.283	3.688

Table 2 shows that all statements were statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. The Table also shows that the absolute difference between the mean value in different groups is 0.1 which means that there was no significant difference between the means of the different populations.

Table 3: Multivariate analysis for constraints in implementing decentralisation

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	.977	645.836 ^b	6.000	93.000	.000
	Wilks' Lambda	.023	645.836 ^b	6.000	93.000	.000
	Hotelling's Trace	41.667	645.836 ^b	6.000	93.000	.000
	Roy's Largest Root	41.667	645.836 ^b	6.000	93.000	.000
@5.5Failuretoimplementthedecentralisationstructurebygovernment	Pillai's Trace	.636	4.259	18.000	285.000	.000
	Wilks' Lambda	.416	5.319	18.000	263.529	.000
	Hotelling's Trace	1.278	6.510	18.000	275.000	.000
	Roy's Largest Root	1.173	18.579 ^c	6.000	95.000	.000

a. Design: Intercept + @5.5Failuretoimplementthedecentralisationstructurebygovernment

b. Exact statistic

c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level.

Table 3 shows the Pillai's trace (used as a test statistic in MANOVA. This is a positive valued statistic ranging from 0 to 1). The high value of Pillai's trace (0.977) means that effects are contributing more to the failure to implement the decentralization structure by government. Here we have 0.977 at intercept and 0.636, which are small enough values that lead to statistical insignificance.

Table 4: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects for Constraints in Implementing Decentralisation

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
@5.5Failuretoimplementthedecentralisationstructurebygovernment	5.2 Lack of political will from central government	21.084	3	7.028	5.918	0.00
	5.4 Continued delay to release decentralised function by central government	33.669	3	11.223	26.007	0.00
	5.6 Failure to relinquish some revenue streams to local authorities	16.556	3	5.519	10.599	0.00
	5.12 Government's unclear policy guidance on decentralisation	15.214	3	5.071	3.817	0.01
	5.13 Lack of standardised system as well as monitoring mechanism	4.744	3	1.581	1.501	0.22

	5.14 Failure to increase revenue collection in local authorities	2.003	3	.668	.645	0.59
a. R Squared = .153 (Adjusted R Squared = .127)						
b. R Squared = .443 (Adjusted R Squared = .426)						
c. R Squared = .245 (Adjusted R Squared = .222)						
d. R Squared = .105 (Adjusted R Squared = .077)						
e. R Squared = .044 (Adjusted R Squared = .015)						
f. R Squared = .019 (Adjusted R Squared = -.011)						

Table 4 shows that the interaction is significant between statements simple main effects (5.5-5.2), (5.5-5.4), (5.5-5.6) and (5.5-5.12) when exploring the nature of the interaction by examining the difference between groups within one level of statement 5.5. However, the interaction is insignificant with respect to statements simple main effects (5.5-5.13) and (5.5-5.14) where $p=0.22$ and $p=0.59$ respectively.

5.0. Discussion

Decentralization is the summit of local authority autonomy. For years, decentralization implementation has been slow and most recently, government has attempted to speed up the process of decentralization. In most countries, like Zambia, the design of decentralization reforms restricts local government autonomy by regulating public expenditure and public service provision (Ashraf, Bandiera and Blum, 2016). The result of full decentralization would lead to considerable decrease of state control and regulation thereby releasing benefits of decentralized own-source revenues to local authorities. The research found that the major constraints in implementing decentralization included (Table 1):

1. Continued delay to release decentralized functions by central government
2. Lack of political will from central government
3. Failure to implement the agreed decentralized structure by central government
4. Failure to relinquish some revenue streams to local authorities
5. Governments unclear policy guidance on decentralization
6. Lack of a standardized system as well as a monitoring mechanism
7. Failure to generate adequate own revenue by local authorities

In Zimbabwe, a study conducted by Zhou and Chilunjika (2014) agreed with the findings of this research by indicating that it was difficult for local authorities to create a robust self-financing base due to compromises by interlocking factors that included;

1. Continued central government grip,
2. limited revenue base,
3. failure to devise long range revenue optimizing strategies,
4. political interference, and
5. institutionalized culture of rent seeking

This explains that to achieve local authority autonomy through decentralization require more efforts from the national government, in terms of enacting policies that will create an enabling environment for full decentralization to happen. This study has shown the need for the Zambian government to learn from developed countries that grants alone and direct delivery and distribution of goods and services would not achieve what the local government tier require to become effective and efficient local service providers. It benefits all stakeholders, the state included, when local authorities perform effectively and efficiently. Saito (1999) researched Uganda's districts of Kampala, Mukono, Rakai, and Tororo and established significant possibilities in decentralizing local authorities, which could be harnessed by all essential stakeholders including the state and the people. Accordingly, local authority autonomy ought to be a win-win consequence rather than a win-lose one. Another good example is Brazil were local government decides its own public policy on expenditure and supply of local public goods. Arvate (2013) investigated the relationship between electoral competition and local government responsiveness in Brazil and established that the effective number of candidates (electoral competition) increased the supply of public goods. If implemented with mutual consideration, decentralization assigns appropriate responsibilities to central government and local authorities so that it does not lead to the disappearance of central government or the dominance of local authorities.

The results of this study suggest the irrefutable need to review the implementation of decentralization and promptly address all the impeding factors to decentralization in order to empower and reposition local authorities in the governance system. This study shows that empowering and developing capacities of local authorities' require endless political will (*Table 1 and Table 2*) more than disbursements of grants on the part of national government. The challenges Zambia was facing with respect to local authority autonomy were not unique. Likewise, the study established that government's unclear policy guidance with respect to decentralization (*Table 1*) was one major contributor to failure to implement decentralization in Zambia. In Malawi, unclear policy guidance led to unreconciled and contradictory policy reforms (Cammack and Kanyongolo 2010). This policy incoherence is a reflection of collective failure at the level of central government and undermines the ability to work together and achieve full decentralization (O'Neil & Cammack, 2014). In Kenya, policy incoherence led to a proliferation of actors, scrambling for resources and a bias of resource allocation (Rampa, 2011). Mutebi (2005) points out that due to too much central government influence over the local authorities and lack of funds the Thai local authorities had to transfer some of their responsibilities back to the central government.

Efforts to enhance local authority autonomy in Rwanda began through the decentralization process in 2000 and since then Rwanda has made important progress such that local authorities claim unprecedented range of competences and resources (Chemouni, 2013). Whereas in Zambia, this research found that fiscal autonomy of local authorities were very restricted with respect to local revenue resource and utilization. Revenues are limited due to regulations as well as excessive political interventions. Expenditure is inflexible because the grants from the central government are by guidelines earmarked for specific functions.

The allocation of expenditures between priority sectors shows substantial differences between the case councils (*Table 4.1*). In particular, Table 4.1 shows a heavy allocation of expenditure to the education sector compared to other sectors. The survey results coupled with the contract documentation reviewed showed that there is need for reviewing the existing revenue streams to include other key sectors in each district in order to achieve the main objectives of empowering and enhancing local authority autonomy through decentralization (*Table 4.22*). The study specifically identifies the following measures as enhancement factors:

1. Reviewing the existing revenue streams to include other key sectors in each district to expand revenue bases
2. Government to have a strategic plan on how to retain and build capacity of local authority staff
3. Government to identify local authorities with capacity to attain autonomy and put them on a deliberate programme for 5 years
4. Local authorities to implement electronic revenue collection measures and adopt participatory budgeting approaches
5. Develop flexible systems that enhance public-private-partnerships of local authorities and review valuation roles
6. Develop mechanisms to allow local authorities to learn from each other on best practices within 3 years
7. Local government service commission to ensure a qualified and motivated staff at all times
8. Transfer staff holding devolved functions to local authorities with their corresponding revenue streams within 5 years
9. Delimitate bigger wards into smaller ones to facilitate close administration and champion legislative reforms
10. Facilitate formation of ward development committees to defend community interests
11. Government to review its grant policy so as to prioritize funding only local authorities that are truly in need and can demonstrate financial vulnerabilities

The study found that a detailed and comprehensive strategic and economic plan with clear outputs within a particular period and framework would be one of the best practices for the establishing local authority autonomy. Cox (2010) established that with a constrained fiscal autonomy of local government there would always be a limited sense of direct responsibility. This study establishes that it is difficult to enhance fiscal autonomy of local authorities without the necessary political will and facilitations by the national

government; to equip them properly for the extra demands that full decentralization entails. In South Africa, a study by Siddle and Koelble (2016) demonstrated how the demands of an overly ambitious decentralization experiment could retard developmental agenda by placing too many demands on local authorities that are unprepared.

Additionally, this research found that local authorities' ability to enhance internal revenue generation could support decentralization, which might be too costly for the national government to finance alone through grants and national resource envelope. Research on the state of decentralization in Cameroun by Comas Cheka (2007) found that the process to achieving local autonomy is hampered by financial constraints on local authorities besides limited capacities of the actors and beneficiaries of devolved powers. Evidently, as in the case of Cameroun, advocating decentralization or local autonomy while regulating revenue sources for local authorities creates a paradoxical situation from which local authorities cannot escape because of contradictory rules.

6.0 Conclusion

The research establishes that decentralization is the pinnacle of local authority autonomy in Zambia. The study concludes that the result of full decentralisation would lead to considerable decrease of state control and regulation thereby releasing benefits of decentralized own-source revenues to local authorities. The research also argues that the major constraints in implementing decentralisation included:

1. Continued delay to release decentralised functions by central government
2. Lack of political will from central government
3. Failure to implement the agreed decentralised structure by central government
4. Failure to relinquish some revenue streams to local authorities
5. Governments unclear policy guidance on decentralisation
6. Lack of a standardised system as well as a monitoring mechanism
7. Failure to generate adequate own revenue by local authorities

The results of this study suggest the irrefutable need to review the implementation of decentralisation and promptly address all the impeding factors to decentralisation in order to empower and reposition local authorities in the governance system. This study shows that empowering and developing capacities of local authorities' require endless political will more than disbursements of grants on the part of national government. Research results showed that there is need for reviewing the existing revenue streams to include other key sectors in each district in order to achieve the main objectives of empowering and enhancing local authority autonomy through decentralisation. Specifically, the study identified the following measures as factors to enhance local authority autonomy in Zambia:

1. Reviewing the existing revenue streams to include other key sectors in each district to expand revenue bases
2. Government to have a strategic plan on how to retain and build capacity of local authority staff
3. Government to identify local authorities with capacity to attain autonomy and put them on a deliberate programme for 5 years
4. Local authorities to implement electronic revenue collection measures and adopt participatory budgeting approaches
5. Develop flexible systems that enhance public-private-partnerships of local authorities and review valuation roles
6. Develop mechanisms to allow local authorities to learn from each other on best practices within 3 years
7. Local government service commission to ensure a qualified and motivated staff at all times
8. Transfer staff holding devolved functions to local authorities with their corresponding revenue streams within 5 years
9. Delimitate bigger wards into smaller ones to facilitate close administration and champion legislative reforms
10. Facilitate formation of ward development committees to defend community interests
11. Government to review its grant policy so as to prioritise funding only local authorities that are truly in need and can demonstrate financial vulnerabilities.

The result are a basis to address drawbacks in the current local government administration system, encourage and fast track decentralization and guarantee local authority autonomy.

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