Whatsapp as a Platform for Political Communication during the 2023 Presidential Election In Makeni – Sierra Leone

1. Introduction

The expansion of social media has altered how political information is produced, circulated, interpreted and contested. Unlike conventional mass media, in which communication has historically been organized around professional journalists, editors and institutional gatekeepers, social media allow individuals to participate directly in the production and circulation of political content (Boyd and Ellison, 2007; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Kietzmann et al., 2011). These changes have generated competing interpretations. Optimistic scholarship emphasizes reduced communication costs, political mobilisation, citizen voice and new forms of participation (Shirky, 2011; Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Tufekci, 2017), while critical scholarship draws attention to misinformation, manipulation, polarization, surveillance and fragmented public discourse (Morozov, 2011; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Cinelli et al., 2021). The political consequences of social media therefore depend on the interaction between technological affordances, users, political actors, information environments and institutions (van Dijck, Poell and de Waal, 2018; Gorwa, 2019).

WhatsApp is especially important because it combines interpersonal communication with group-based communication in private and semi-private environments. Its functions include individual messaging, group discussion, multimedia sharing and forwarding, enabling political content to circulate through networks of people who may know one another personally (Seufert et al., 2016; Garimella and Tyson, 2018; Resende et al., 2019). This architecture creates both opportunities and challenges. Citizens can communicate rapidly outside conventional media gatekeeping, but researchers, regulators and other outsiders have less visibility into the circulation of political content. Encryption protects privacy while also limiting external monitoring (Gorwa, Binns and Katzenbach, 2020).

In Sierra Leone, WhatsApp has become part of the political communication environment alongside traditional media. Existing Sierra Leonean scholarship identifies growing social-media use for political engagement, citizen journalism and accountability, while also identifying ethical, regulatory and misinformation challenges (Bangura, 2017; Dumbuya, 2019; Shaw, 2018; Shaw, 2019). Makeni provides a useful local setting for examining these dynamics because the city was selected for its political relevance, active digital user base and importance in political mobilisation during the 2023 presidential election. The present study focuses specifically on WhatsApp rather than treating social media as an undifferentiated category.

The problem addressed by this study is therefore the dual role of WhatsApp in electoral politics. On one hand, the platform provides citizens with low-cost, rapid and interactive opportunities to communicate, mobilise, share election information and demand accountability. On the other, its closed and encrypted architecture can facilitate the rapid circulation of misinformation, propaganda, hate speech and political manipulation, particularly where digital literacy and regulatory mechanisms are limited (Gagliardone et al., 2015; Arnaudo, 2017; Donovan and Boyd, 2021; Bradshaw and Howard, 2018). The thesis identifies a gap in localized empirical research on WhatsApp political communication in Sierra Leone, particularly concerning citizen demands for electoral information, the role of group administrators and democratic regulation in encrypted spaces.

The study therefore aimed to examine how WhatsApp was utilized as a platform for political communication, citizen participation and electoral transparency during the 2023 presidential elections in Makeni, with particular attention to its potential and limitations in supporting inclusive democratic engagement and responsible regulation. Four objectives guided the study: to identify uses of WhatsApp for political communication and mobilisation; to examine how residents used WhatsApp to participate in the election; to analyze the effects of using WhatsApp in citizens’ demands for disaggregated electoral data from ECSL; and to examine limitations and challenges while proposing a democratic regulatory framework. The study's significance lies in its platform-specific and locality-specific contribution to scholarship on political communication, digital democracy, electoral accountability and governance in the Global South.

2. Literature Review and Research Gap

The literature conceptualizes social media as communication environments characterized by interaction, user-generated content, networking and participation (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Kietzmann et al., 2011). Castells (2009) and Shirky (2011) emphasize the changing distribution of communication power and the reduced costs of collective communication, while Bennett and Segerberg (2012) describe digitally mediated participation through personalised networks as connective action. Tufekci (2017) similarly argues that networked technologies can lower the organisational barriers to mobilisation, although rapid digital mobilisation does not necessarily guarantee sustained organization or long-term political strategy.

Research on political participation generally reports an association between social-media use and civic or political engagement, although causality and direction remain contested. Boulianne (2015), in a meta-analysis, finds a generally positive relationship but notes methodological variation. Gil de Zúñiga, Jung and Valenzuela (2012) connect social-media use with news consumption, social capital, civic engagement and political participation. At the same time, Theocharis and Lowe (2016) caution against treating online activity as a simple proxy for broader political participation. These debates support a broader definition of participation that includes political discussion, information seeking, sharing, monitoring and civic engagement rather than platform use alone.

Electoral communication is another important area. Digital platforms allow political parties and candidates to disseminate campaign materials directly to voters and enable citizens to communicate, discuss and circulate election information (Chadwick, 2013; Kreiss, 2016). Social media may contribute to transparency by increasing access to information, facilitating citizen monitoring, supporting accountability claims and shortening the time between an event and public awareness (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 2010; Loader and Mercea, 2011). However, information availability is not identical to information integrity. Information abundance can increase exposure to misleading content, making verification and media literacy central to meaningful transparency (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017).

Misinformation is particularly relevant to WhatsApp because political information can circulate through interpersonal trust and private or semi-private groups. Resende et al. (2019) and Garimella and Tyson (2018) show how WhatsApp's architecture affects information diffusion. The thesis also draws on the broader literature on information disorder, political manipulation and polarization (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Cinelli et al., 2021). Importantly, WhatsApp should not be treated as the original cause of misinformation: false information can originate in political organizations, traditional media and interpersonal communication. Rather, the platform can provide an environment that facilitates its circulation.

Regulation creates a further tension. Gillespie (2018) and Gorwa (2019) emphasize the governance role of platforms and the interaction among governments, companies, civil society and users. Kaye (2019) warns that regulation can also threaten legitimate expression if rules are broad or poorly implemented. For encrypted messaging, governance cannot depend solely on external monitoring. The literature therefore points toward combinations of digital literacy, user responsibility, platform responsibility, community moderation, institutional verification and democratic governance. Livingstone (2004) and Guess et al. (2020) emphasize the importance of media and digital literacy, while Kahan (2017) and Pennycook and Rand (2019) demonstrate that information behaviour is also influenced by reasoning, identity and other social factors.

The thesis identifies four principal gaps. First, much empirical research addresses social media generally or focuses on open platforms such as Facebook and X/Twitter rather than WhatsApp. Second, limited research examines how citizens in a specific Sierra Leonean locality use WhatsApp for electoral participation and transparency. Third, citizen demands for electoral information and accountability through encrypted messaging receive comparatively little platform-specific attention. Fourth, WhatsApp group administrators and the informal governance of political discussion are under-examined. The present study responds to these gaps by combining survey evidence from active users in Makeni with interviews with group administrators, thereby connecting national debates about responsible social-media governance with a specific electoral and local communication environment.

3. Theoretical Framework

The study uses three complementary theoretical perspectives: Mobilization Theory, Information Processing Theory and Political Communication Theory. The thesis deliberately combines these perspectives because no single theory captures WhatsApp's multidimensional role in an electoral environment. WhatsApp can function simultaneously as a network for political action, an information environment in which users receive and evaluate messages, and a communication arena involving citizens, political actors, media and institutions.

Mobilization Theory explains the collective-action dimension. WhatsApp can reduce communication and coordination costs, facilitate campaign activity, connect supporters and enable election-monitoring or civic activities. Information Processing Theory addresses what happens when users encounter political information. Users must attend to, interpret, evaluate, accept, reject, discuss or redistribute information. This perspective is particularly relevant where political information is contested or misleading. Political Communication Theory provides the wider environment within which messages are produced, transmitted, received and contested by political actors, citizens, media and institutions.

The integrated relationship can be represented as: Political Communication → Information Exposure and processing → Political Interaction → Mobilisation and Participation. The process is not necessarily linear. Political participation can generate new messages, which can then be processed and redistributed. The theoretical framework therefore treats WhatsApp as an interactive political communication environment rather than simply a one-way channel. It also accommodates the duality identified in the study: the same network can facilitate election monitoring and civic participation while also facilitating misinformation, polarization and harmful political communication.

The theoretical findings later demonstrate this complementarity. Political Communication Theory explains the widespread receipt and discussion of political information; Information Processing Theory highlights the importance of evaluating campaign materials, election updates and misinformation; and Mobilization Theory explains the use of WhatsApp for political discussion, campaign mobilisation, election-monitoring groups and information sharing. Together, these theories provide an analytical basis for understanding how communication, cognition and collective action interact in digitally mediated electoral politics.

4. Methodology

The study adopted a mixed-methods research design. The quantitative component consisted principally of a structured survey of active WhatsApp users, while a smaller qualitative component involved key informant interviews with WhatsApp group administrators concerning democratic regulation. The mixed-methods approach was intended to provide measurable evidence of political communication, participation, transparency and regulatory perceptions while allowing administrators to explain practical issues of group governance and moderation.

The research was conducted in Makeni, the regional headquarters of Sierra Leone's Northern Province. The city was selected because of its political relevance, active digital environment and importance in political mobilisation during the 2023 election. The study population comprised members of ten WhatsApp groups based in Makeni that were actively engaged in political discussion, mobilisation and information sharing. The thesis identifies a total group membership of 584 and an accessible population of 150 individuals who were consistently active in political discussions. Ten group administrators were also identified as potential key informants.

The ten groups represented different parts of the socio-political landscape, including political parties, students, civil society, media, traders, commercial transport operators, health workers, teachers, religious institutions and security personnel. The study used purposive sampling to select participants directly involved in the phenomenon under investigation. A structured questionnaire was administered to 150 selected WhatsApp users, of whom 100 completed and returned the instrument. Six of the ten group administrators contacted participated in key informant interviews.

The questionnaire used Likert-scale items covering WhatsApp political communication, citizen participation, electoral transparency and accountability, and challenges and democratic regulation. The semi-structured interview guide focused on principles of democratic regulation, freedom of expression, stakeholder participation, administrator training, community standards and the balance between legal and voluntary mechanisms. Content, face and construct validity were addressed through alignment with the objectives and literature, expert review and pilot testing. Reliability procedures included internal consistency checks and a pilot test; the thesis reports use of Cronbach's alpha and a small test-retest procedure.

Quantitative data were analysed primarily through descriptive statistics, presenting frequencies and percentages for the 100 completed questionnaires. Qualitative interviews were analysed thematically. The study also describes researcher participation-observation within the selected WhatsApp groups for purposes of identifying the accessible population and understanding the group environment. However, the study did not conduct forensic analysis of private messages because of privacy and ethical concerns. Ethical procedures included informed consent, confidentiality, voluntary participation, data security and precautions against social or reputational harm in a politically sensitive research setting. The study acknowledges important limitations: purposive non-probability sampling limits generalizability; self-reported data may be affected by recall or social-desirability bias; the study is geographically limited to Makeni; the retrospective design concerns the 2023 election period; and focusing on WhatsApp excludes the wider digital and traditional media ecosystem.

5. Results

5.1 Respondent Profile

The survey sample was 54% male and 46% female. Sixty-five percent were aged 25–44, 20% were aged 18–24 and 15% were aged 45 or older. Sixty percent had tertiary qualifications, while 40% had secondary education or below. Occupationally, students and political-party members each accounted for 20%; civil society, media workers and teachers collectively represented 30%; informal-sector workers including bike/motor drivers and traders represented 20%; religious workers accounted for 4%; and security personnel 6%. The profile indicates participation across gender, age and occupational categories, although the sample was predominantly working-age and relatively highly educated.

5.2 WhatsApp for Political Communication and Mobilisation

The findings show extensive political use of WhatsApp. Eighty percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they used WhatsApp to receive political messages during the 2023 election (30% strongly agree; 50% agree). Eighty-seven percent agreed or strongly agreed that WhatsApp groups were active in political discussion during the campaign (45% strongly agree; 42% agree). Eighty-two percent agreed or strongly agreed that political parties used WhatsApp to mobilise support (42% strongly agree; 40% agree).

The distribution of campaign materials was especially pronounced: 98% agreed or strongly agreed that they received campaign flyers or manifestos through WhatsApp, with 46% strongly agreeing and 52% agreeing. Ninety percent agreed or strongly agreed that WhatsApp enabled rapid dissemination of political news and updates. These findings indicate that WhatsApp served as both a distribution channel and an interactive political communication environment. The near-universal receipt of campaign materials also suggests that digital campaign communication was embedded in users' electoral information practices.

5.3 Citizen Participation through WhatsApp

Eighty percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they participated in political discussions through WhatsApp during the election (30% strongly agree; 50% agree). Seventy-six percent reported that they were part of WhatsApp groups that monitored electoral processes (28% strongly agree; 48% agree). Ninety-one percent agreed or strongly agreed that they used WhatsApp to share or forward information related to voting and election procedures (41% strongly agree; 50% agree).

Eighty-five percent agreed or strongly agreed that WhatsApp enabled them to stay informed about voting locations and times (30% strongly agree; 55% agree). Seventy-seven percent agreed or strongly agreed that WhatsApp increased their interest in political participation (33% strongly agree; 44% agree). The findings therefore indicate participation beyond passive receipt of messages: users reported discussion, monitoring, information sharing and access to practical electoral information.

5.4 Electoral Transparency and Accountability

Seventy-one percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they used WhatsApp to demand electoral data from ECSL or other officials (26% strongly agree; 45% agree). Eighty-five percent agreed or strongly agreed that WhatsApp helped expose issues of electoral malpractice or irregularities (35% strongly agree; 50% agree). Eighty-eight percent agreed or strongly agreed that they followed live updates and election results through WhatsApp (32% strongly agree; 56% agree).

Ninety percent agreed or strongly agreed that WhatsApp helped spread awareness of voters' rights (38% strongly agree; 52% agree). Seventy-nine percent agreed or strongly agreed that information shared on WhatsApp promoted transparency in the electoral process (33% strongly agree; 46% agree). These figures indicate that users associated WhatsApp with accountability-oriented communication as well as campaign communication. Importantly, the thesis treats these as respondents' reported experiences and perceptions; they do not independently verify particular electoral incidents or the accuracy of information circulated on WhatsApp.

5.5 Challenges and Democratic Regulation

Misinformation was the most consistently identified challenge. All respondents agreed or strongly agreed that WhatsApp was frequently used to spread misinformation and false political content during the election period (60% strongly agree; 40% agree). Ninety percent agreed or strongly agreed that the private and encrypted nature of WhatsApp groups made it difficult for authorities to monitor harmful or illegal political activities (33% strongly agree; 57% agree).

Eighty-nine percent agreed or strongly agreed that authorities should regulate WhatsApp to prevent the spread of political misinformation (41% strongly agree; 48% agree). Ninety-three percent agreed or strongly agreed that a democratic framework was needed to monitor political communication without infringing freedom of expression, together with training for group administrators on ethical content moderation (58% strongly agree; 35% agree). Ninety-five percent agreed or strongly agreed that government should collaborate with civil society to promote digital literacy and ethical guidelines for responsible WhatsApp use during elections (61% strongly agree; 34% agree).

5.6 Qualitative Findings from WhatsApp Group Administrators

Six WhatsApp group administrators were interviewed. Six themes emerged: support for democratic regulation; regulation of misinformation and harmful content; protection of freedom of expression; multi-stakeholder participation; training and support for group administrators; and a hybrid approach combining legal and community-based mechanisms. All six administrators supported mechanisms that would promote responsible communication while protecting legitimate political participation.

Administrators emphasized fairness, transparency, accountability and equal application of rules. They distinguished political opinion from harmful communication and argued that users should remain free to support parties or candidates and criticize policies. At the same time, they identified false information, fabricated election results, hate speech, threats, incitement, manipulated content and personal attacks as forms of communication requiring attention. Fact-checking and verification before forwarding were repeatedly emphasized.

The administrators also flavored multi-stakeholder participation. Government, NATCA, civil society, platform owners, community leaders, media organisations and users were identified as relevant actors. The interviews did not support a model in which government alone controls political communication. Administrators further supported training in digital literacy, fact-checking, misinformation identification, conflict-sensitive communication, content moderation and reporting procedures. Finally, the qualitative evidence supported a hybrid model in which formal legal safeguards are complemented by group-level community rules and responsible moderation.

5.7 Triangulation

The quantitative and qualitative findings converge on the need for responsible digital governance. The survey establishes broad support for addressing misinformation, training administrators and promoting collaboration. The interviews explain what these measures might entail: verification, fact-checking, community standards, responsible moderation, administrator training, digital literacy and participation by multiple stakeholders. The convergence does not mean that every respondent or administrator held identical views, but it demonstrates a consistent overall pattern across the two strands of evidence.

6. Discussion

The results demonstrate that WhatsApp occupied a broad role in Makeni's 2023 electoral communication environment. The 80% agreement that respondents received political messages and the 87% agreement that groups were active in political discussion are consistent with scholarship that treats digital platforms as interactive environments rather than merely distribution channels (Castells, 2009; Chadwick, 2013). The 82% perception that political parties used WhatsApp to mobilise support also reflects the literature on digitally facilitated mobilisation and connective action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Tufekci, 2017).

The 98% agreement that respondents received campaign flyers or manifestos through WhatsApp is particularly notable. It indicates that campaign communication was integrated into interpersonal and group-based digital networks. The thesis relates this pattern to the wider transformation of campaign communication through digital tools (Kreiss, 2016) and to the capacity of digital communication to distribute political content directly to citizens. The 90% agreement concerning rapid political news and updates further indicates that WhatsApp functioned as a real-time information network. However, speed should not be equated with accuracy, an issue underscored by the misinformation findings.

Citizen participation findings likewise support a broad interpretation of digital political engagement. The 80% participation in political discussions, 76% involvement in electoral-monitoring groups and 91% sharing of voting information show that respondents reported multiple forms of participation. The 85% who used WhatsApp to stay informed about voting locations and times and the 77% who reported increased interest in political participation reinforce the platform's informational and participatory functions. These results are consistent with Boulianne's (2015) finding of an overall positive relationship between social-media use and civic or political participation, while the study's design does not establish that WhatsApp independently caused participation.

The electoral-transparency findings extend the discussion from campaign communication to accountability. Seventy-one percent reported using WhatsApp to demand electoral data, 85% associated the platform with exposing malpractice or irregularities, and 88% followed live updates and results. These patterns are consistent with the literature's account of social media as a channel for citizen monitoring and accountability claims (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 2010; Loader and Mercea, 2011). The important qualification is methodological: the study measures respondents' experiences and perceptions rather than independently verifying the underlying electoral events or claims circulated through WhatsApp.

The findings on misinformation demonstrate the dual character of the platform. All respondents acknowledged the circulation of misinformation and false political content, while 90% identified the private and encrypted nature of WhatsApp groups as a monitoring challenge. This is consistent with literature emphasizing the difficulty of governing information in private or semi-private networks (Garimella and Tyson, 2018; Resende et al., 2019; Gorwa, Binns and Katzenbach, 2020). The result should not be interpreted to mean that WhatsApp itself produces misinformation. Rather, its communication architecture facilitates rapid interpersonal circulation of information, making verification and moderation difficult.

The strong support for regulation must also be interpreted in relation to freedom of expression. The survey's 93% support for a democratic framework and the administrators' unanimous support for responsible regulation were accompanied by an emphasis on protecting legitimate political opinion. This mirrors the literature's tension between platform accountability and the risk that regulation can suppress legitimate speech (Gillespie, 2018; Kaye, 2019). The study's qualitative evidence therefore supports a rights-conscious approach focused on harmful behaviour, verification, community standards and responsible moderation rather than undifferentiated suppression of political expression.

The findings also reinforce the importance of digital literacy. The thesis connects the educational profile of respondents and the challenge of misinformation to scholarship emphasizing critical evaluation of digital content (Livingstone, 2004; Guess et al., 2020). Yet the literature also warns that literacy alone is insufficient because political identity, emotional responses and motivated reasoning can affect information behaviour (Kahan, 2017; Pennycook and Rand, 2019). Accordingly, the study's proposed approach combines literacy with verification, platform responsibility, user responsibility, administrator training and institutional communication.

The three theoretical perspectives provide a coherent interpretation of the results. Political Communication Theory explains the platform as an environment in which citizens, political actors and institutions exchange and contest messages. Information Processing Theory highlights how users encounter and evaluate campaign materials, election updates and misinformation. Mobilization Theory explains how those communication networks can facilitate political discussions, campaign mobilisation, monitoring and information sharing. The empirical evidence therefore supports the thesis's integrated proposition that political communication creates an environment, information is encountered and processed within it, and political interaction can contribute to mobilisation and participation. The process remains iterative because participation itself produces new messages that can circulate through the network.

The study's contribution is consequently both empirical and conceptual. Empirically, it provides platform-specific evidence from Makeni rather than treating all social media as equivalent. It also brings WhatsApp group administrators into the analysis of political communication governance. Conceptually, it links communication, information processing and mobilisation while treating democratic opportunities and information risks as coexisting features of the same communication environment. In relation to Sierra Leone, it complements broader work by MRCG and its partners, BBC Media Action and SLAJ on social media, media literacy, ethical communication and regulation by focusing specifically on WhatsApp during an electoral process in Makeni.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

The study concludes that WhatsApp constituted an important platform for political communication during the 2023 presidential elections in Makeni. Its group-based and networked structure provided opportunities for political messages, campaign information and electoral information to circulate rapidly. The findings show that users engaged in political discussion, shared voting information, participated in monitoring groups and followed electoral updates. WhatsApp was also associated by respondents with demands for electoral information, awareness of voters' rights, exposure of perceived irregularities and wider communication about transparency and accountability.

At the same time, the platform's democratic potential existed alongside substantial risks. Misinformation was unanimously acknowledged by respondents, and the private and encrypted nature of groups was widely perceived as a monitoring challenge. The evidence therefore supports neither an exclusively optimistic nor an exclusively negative account of WhatsApp. Instead, the platform's democratic contribution depends partly on how information is evaluated, how groups are moderated, how institutions communicate with citizens and how governance mechanisms protect both expression and accountability.

The study recommends stronger digital and media literacy programmes for citizens; training for WhatsApp group administrators in fact-checking, misinformation management, conflict-sensitive communication, hate-speech prevention and ethical moderation; multi-stakeholder collaboration involving government, civil society, media organisations, technology companies and users; stronger digital communication mechanisms through which ECSL can provide timely and accurate electoral information; and continued platform development of mechanisms for identifying and reporting harmful or misleading content while safeguarding privacy and legitimate political expression.

Future research should examine WhatsApp political communication in other regions of Sierra Leone and across different electoral contexts. Comparative studies involving WhatsApp, Facebook, TikTok and X could investigate how platform architecture shapes political communication, mobilisation and participation. Longitudinal research could also examine how WhatsApp communication changes across electoral cycles and incorporate perspectives from political parties, electoral officials, journalists, civil society organisations and ordinary users.

8. Contribution of the Study

The study contributes a platform-specific and geographically situated account of WhatsApp political communication in Makeni. It provides empirical evidence concerning political communication, mobilisation, citizen participation, electoral transparency and regulatory perceptions during a specific presidential election. It also contributes to the discussion of digital governance by incorporating the perspectives of WhatsApp group administrators and by identifying a possible governance orientation that combines digital literacy, fact-checking, community standards, administrator training, multi-stakeholder participation, accountability and safeguards for legitimate political expression. In doing so, the study connects broader Sierra Leonean debates about responsible social-media use with evidence from an actual WhatsApp-based electoral communication environment.

The study's contribution should be interpreted within its methodological boundaries. The purposive sample, self-reported data, Makeni-specific setting and focus on WhatsApp mean that the findings should not be generalized automatically to all Sierra Leonean citizens, all social-media platforms or all electoral contexts. Nevertheless, the evidence provides a detailed local case through which broader questions about encrypted messaging, political communication and democratic governance can be examined.