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Political Science
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From Geography to Data: A New Theory of Strategic Depth in the Information Age

DOI: 10.18535/ijsrm/v14i06.ps01· Pages: 165-194· Vol. 14, No. 06, (2026)· Published: June 21, 2026
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Abstract

The digital transformation of contemporary societies has fundamentally reshaped the traditional foundations of sovereignty, security, and state power. Although geopolitical scholarship has long established strategic depth as a concept associated with the territorial dimension of states, no comprehensive theoretical framework currently explains how strategic depth is constructed in highly interconnected digital environments. This article proposes the Theory of Cyber Strategic Depth (TCSD) as an extension of the classical concept of strategic depth to the Information Age. The study adopts a qualitative and exploratory-explanatory approach, combining a systematic literature review based on the PRISMA 2020 protocol, the hypothetical-deductive method, and a case study of the Brazilian PIX ecosystem. It argues that the strategic survival of states increasingly depends on their ability to develop depth across the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace while simultaneously reducing external technological dependence. As its principal theoretical contribution, the article introduces the Cyber Strategic Depth Index (CSDI), designed to assess and compare the informational resilience of states. The findings suggest that contemporary strategic depth is no longer determined primarily by territorial extent but by a state's capacity to absorb, resist, adapt to, and recover from threats directed against its national information ecosystem. The study concludes that Cyber Strategic Depth constitutes a new projection of National Power and has emerged as one of the fundamental pillars of sovereignty in the twenty-first century.

Keywords

Cyber Strategic Depth Cyber Sovereignty National Power Digital Geopolitics National Resilience Cybersecurity.

Introduction

The technological transformations that have occurred in recent decades have brought about one of the most profound changes in the history of the political, economic, and social organization of humanity. The digitization of productive activities, the expansion of global communication networks, the emergence of digital platforms, and the advancement of artificial intelligence have significantly altered the traditional mechanisms of exercising power and sovereignty.

Historically, the survival capacity of states has been associated with the control of geographic spaces. Geography functioned simultaneously as a strategic resource and a protection mechanism. Mountains, deserts, oceans, and jungles increased the capacity to resist external threats. In this context, strategic depth has become one of the central concepts of geopolitics and strategic studies.

It is understood, in its classical sense, as the capacity of a state to absorb threats through the geographic distance between its borders and its vital centers of power. The greater this distance, the more time available for mobilizing resources, reorganizing national forces, and preserving the capacity to resist.

History offers numerous examples of the relevance of this concept. Russia resisted Napoleonic and German invasions largely thanks to its territorial depth. The United States benefited from the protection offered by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The United Kingdom used its insular condition to preserve its security in the face of successive continental threats. In all these cases, geography constituted a fundamental element of strategic survival.

However, the consolidation of the Information Age has profoundly changed this logic. The growing dependence on digital infrastructures has produced a scenario in which geographical distance has lost a significant part of its strategic relevance. A cyberattack conducted thousands of kilometers away can produce immediate effects on financial systems, energy networks, telecommunications, government structures, and military infrastructure. The distance factor, historically associated with strategic protection, has become less relevant in the face of the speed of information flows.

At the same time, new strategic assets have come to occupy a central position in international relations. Data, algorithms, artificial intelligence systems, data centers, digital networks, and technological platforms have become fundamental resources to produce wealth, the exercise of power, and the preservation of sovereignty.

This transformation has produced a structural change in state vulnerabilities. While threats were predominantly directed at physical territory for much of history, in the 21st century they have increasingly impacted digital infrastructures, information systems, and collective perceptions. Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, digital espionage, algorithmic manipulation, and technological dependence have become central challenges to the autonomy and independence of states.

Thus, a central problem arises: how can states preserve their strategic independence in an area characterized by increasing digital dependence and the reduced relevance of geographical distance?

Contemporary literature offers partial answers to this question. Studies on Cyber ​​Power analyze the projection of power in the cyber domain. Theories of Digital Sovereignty discuss the governance capacity of information flows. Models of National Resilience investigate adaptation mechanisms in the face of complex crises. The literature on Cyber ​​Sovereignty examines state autonomy in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace.

However, a model capable of explaining how states build strategic depth in their cyber ecosystems remains absent.

This gap becomes particularly relevant given the growing dependence of contemporary societies on digital systems. The disruption of financial platforms, energy systems, communication networks, or government infrastructures can produce impacts equivalent to or greater than those observed in conventional conflicts.

Based on this observation, the article proposes the Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth (TSD). It argues that the strategic survival of states in the Information Age involves the ability to build depth in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace while reducing their external technological dependence.

In other words, contemporary strategic depth is not measured solely by territorial extent but by the existence of successive layers of protection, redundancy, autonomy, and resilience capable of preserving the continuity of national power in the face of threats.

directed at the cyber ecosystem.

The central hypothesis of the research states that the strategic survival of states depends more on the depth of their cyber ecosystems than on classic territorial depth.

The article employs a systematic literature review, the hypothetical-deductive method, process tracing, and a case study applied to the Brazilian PIX ecosystem, complemented by an international comparative analysis involving the United States, China, Estonia, and the European Union.

Its main contribution consists of the formulation of a new analytical category aimed at understanding the sovereignty and strategic survival of states in the Information Age. In addition, the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSDI) is proposed, conceived as an instrument for the comparative measurement of the informational resilience capacity of states.

The article is structured in nine sections. After this introduction, the systematic literature review is presented. Then, the theoretical foundations of informational strategic depth, the methodology employed, the analytical model of the theory, the construction of the CSDI, the Brazilian case study, the international comparative validation, and the conclusions are discussed.

1. Systematic Literature Review

1.1 Methodological Procedures of the Review

A systematic literature review was conducted with the objective of identifying the main concepts, theoretical approaches, and gaps in the fields of strategic studies, geopolitics, cybernetics, and international relations related to the strategic survival of states in the Information Age.

The review was conducted based on the guidelines of the PRISMA 2020 protocol (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses), widely used to ensure transparency, traceability, and methodological rigor in review research.

We explored the databases Scopus, Web of Science, JSTOR, Science Direct, Springer Link, Taylor & Francis Online, Wiley Online Library, and Google Scholar.

The descriptors used included the terms: "Strategic Depth", "Strategic Resilience", "Cyber ​​Sovereignty", "Digital Sovereignty", "Cyber ​​Power", "National Resilience", "Cybersecurity Governance", "Information Sovereignty", "Digital Geopolitics", and "Cyber ​​Strategy".

The period analyzed encompassed the years 2000 to 2025, covering the phase of consolidation of cyberspace as a strategic domain and the emergence of contemporary debates on cyber sovereignty, digital sovereignty, and international technological competition.

After removing duplicate records and applying the eligibility criteria, the selected works were grouped into five major analytical currents: Classical Geopolitics and Strategic Depth; National Resilience; Cyber ​​Power; Digital Sovereignty; and Cyber ​​Sovereignty. The results revealed significant scientific production on power, sovereignty, and security in the cyber environment. However, a theoretical framework specifically aimed at understanding strategic depth in cyber ecosystems was not identified.

This finding underpins the proposal of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory.

1.2 Strategic Depth in Classical Geopolitics

The concept of strategic depth has deep roots in the geopolitical tradition. Although not always explicitly named as such, its logic has been present in the main classical authors of the discipline.

Halford Mackinder, in formulating the Heartland theory, associated the capacity for power projection with the control of Eurasian land space. His analysis assumed that geography constituted a permanent factor in international relations and that territorial extension could offer decisive advantages for the survival of states.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, in turn, emphasized the role of maritime power and the ability to control strategic ocean routes. Although his focus was on dominating the seas, the underlying logic remained related to creating strategic depth through the control of geographic spaces.

Nicholas Spykman complemented this perspective by defending the importance of the Rimland as a zone of containment and projection of power. In his view, state survival depended on the ability to control strategic areas that would allow limiting the actions of potential adversaries.

Later, Colin Gray deepened the relationship between geography and strategy by stating that territorial location continues to be a determining element of power, even in the face of technological transformations.

Despite the differences between these authors, they all observe a common element: the association of strategic depth with the spatial dimension of power.

From this perspective, the survival of states depends on the existence of sufficient physical space to absorb threats, preserve resources, and maintain the continuity of national operations.

Digital transformation, however, challenges this assumption. The development of technologies has drastically reduced the protective effects of geographic distance. Financial systems, energy infrastructure, telecommunications, and government networks can be affected by agents located anywhere on the planet.

Thus, while territorial strategic depth remains relevant, it becomes insufficient to explain contemporary reality.

1.3 National Resilience and State Survival

The increasing complexity of global risks has led several authors to investigate the capacity of states to absorb shocks, adapt to crises, and recover their essential functions.

Scholars such as Boin, Comfort, Linkov, and Wildavsky argue that the survival of complex systems depends less on the ability to avoid crises and more on the ability to respond to them efficiently.

The literature on national resilience expanded significantly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and gained new momentum with the growing concern regarding cyber threats.

From this perspective, it is understood as the ability of a system to continue operating even under adverse conditions. The approach offers important contributions to the understanding of contemporary security, especially by emphasizing adaptation, recovery, and operational continuity.

However, the literature on national resilience has significant limitations. Although it explains how states respond to shocks, it does not offer a model capable of showing how strategic depth is built prior to the occurrence of these crises.

In other words, resilience describes the capacity to react, but not necessarily the strategic structure that makes this attitude possible. This gap becomes particularly relevant when analyzed, considering the growing digital dependence of states.

1.4 Cyber ​​Power and International Competition

The emergence of cyberspace as a strategic domain has led several authors to investigate how power is exercised in these environments.

Joseph Nye was one of the first scholars to argue that cyberspace constitutes a new environment of political and strategic dispute. In his interpretation, cyber power corresponds to the ability to use information-related resources to produce desired effects.

Martin Libicki deepened this discussion by analyzing the military and strategic impacts of cyber warfare. His work highlighted the ability of digital attacks to produce significant effects without the need for direct physical confrontation.

Clarke and Knake emphasized the risks associated with the growing dependence on digital infrastructures, arguing that cyberspace has become a central element of contemporary national security.

Literature on cyber power offers important contributions to understanding international strategic competition. However, its attention remains predominantly focused on power projection and the offensive and defensive capabilities of states.

Little attention is paid to building strategic depth as a mechanism for preserving national autonomy and independence.

1.5 Digital Sovereignty and Technological Governance

The growing influence exerted by large technology companies has led several authors to question the ability of states to govern the informational flows that cross their territories.

Floridi argues that digital transformation has produced new forms of technological dependence capable of limiting state autonomy.

Mueller observes that Internet governance has become an area of ​​dispute between states, corporations, and international organizations.

In this context, the European Union has developed one of the most influential approaches to digital sovereignty by emphasizing data protection, technological autonomy, and regulation of digital platforms.

The concept has become particularly relevant in the face of the growing concentration of digital resources in a small number of companies and countries.

Despite its contributions, the literature on digital sovereignty focuses primarily on technological governance and regulatory autonomy. The issue of strategic depth remains relatively marginal.

1.6 Cyber ​​Sovereignty and the Layers of Cyberspace

This approach stems from the recognition that state sovereignty needs to be reinterpreted considering the emergence of cyberspace.

Contemporary literature has come to understand cyberspace as a structure composed of multiple interdependent layers.

The physical layer comprises critical infrastructures, data centers, telecommunications networks, and material resources. The logical layer involves software, protocols, algorithms, and systems responsible for the functioning of the networks. The cognitive layer refers to users, perceptions, behaviors, and opinion-forming processes.

Thus, cyber sovereignty is often understood as the ability to exercise relative control over these three layers.

This approach represents an important theoretical advance because it recognizes that state autonomy depends simultaneously on technological, economic, and social factors. However, even this current does not offer a systematic explanation of how states build strategic depth in each of these layers.

In other words, cyber sovereignty explains autonomy; it does not necessarily explain the mechanisms that guarantee its survival in the face of persistent threats.

1.7 The scientific gap and the need for a new theory

The analysis of the five identified currents reveals a recurring pattern. Classical Geopolitics explains territorial strategic depth. The literature on national resilience explains the capacity for recovery in the face of crises. Studies on Cyber ​​Power explain the projection of power in digital environments. Digital Sovereignty explains technological autonomy. Cyber ​​Sovereignty explains state control over the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace. However, none of them satisfactorily answers the following question:

How do states build strategic depth in cyber ecosystems that are highly dependent on technology, connectivity, and data flows?

This gap constitutes the main scientific understanding identified by this research.

Thus, the Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth emerges precisely to fill this analytical void. Its proposal consists of expanding the classical concept of strategic depth beyond the territorial dimension, incorporating the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace.

The fundamental hypothesis is that the strategic survival of States in the Information Age depends on the ability to build depth in these layers, while simultaneously reducing external technological dependence.

This formulation allows us to establish a conceptual bridge between Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, National Resilience, Cyber ​​Power, and Cyber ​​Sovereignty, offering a new analytical framework for understanding international competition in the 21st century.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 National Power and the transformations of sovereignty in the 21st century

The concept of National Power constitutes one of the central foundations of Strategic Studies. Traditionally, power has been understood as the capacity of a political collectively to achieve and maintain its national objectives, mobilizing material and immaterial resources available in each historical context.

Throughout the 20th century, different schools of thought sought to identify the constituent elements of state power. Although methodological variations exist, there is broad consensus regarding the multidimensional character of National Power, involving political, economic, military, psychosocial, and scientific-technological components.

It is observed that the rise of the Information Age has produced profound transformations in all these dimensions.

Political expression has become increasingly dependent on digital platforms, instant communication systems, and algorithmic influence mechanisms. economic expression has become strongly linked to data flows, digital markets, and global technological infrastructures. The military expression has come to incorporate cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and informational operations. The psychosocial expression has become directly influenced by digital social networks, the circulation of information, and opinion-forming processes mediated by algorithms. The scientific-technological expression has become a determining factor in international competitiveness, especially in the face of the global race for artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and disruptive technologies.

In this context, the informational environment emerges as a transversal dimension of National Power.

Information ceases to be merely a support resource and comes to occupy a central position in the production of wealth, the exercise of political authority, military projection, and the construction of state legitimacy.

Consequently, the very notion of sovereignty is undergoing a process of transformation. Historically, it was associated with territorial control and the legitimate monopoly of political authority within defined borders. The Westphalian logic (1648) presupposed a relative coincidence between political space, territory, and authority.

The digitalization of society has changed this conception. Digital platforms operate simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions. Information flows cross borders without physical restrictions. Transnational corporations have come to exert influence comparable to that of many states, and critical national infrastructures have become dependent on complex global chains of technological supplies.

Contemporary sovereignty now involves not only control of physical territory, but also the ability to govern information flows, protect digital infrastructures, and preserve decisional autonomy in the face of external technological dependencies.

2.2 Cyberspace as a strategic domain

The recognition of cyberspace as a strategic domain represents one of the most important conceptual changes of recent decades. Initially conceived as an environment intended for information sharing and academic communication, it has evolved to become an essential infrastructure for the functioning of contemporary societies.

This growing dependence has produced a significant change in power. Unlike traditional domains—terrestrial, maritime, aerial, and outer space—cyberspace is characterized by a lack of effective governance, scarce public debate, a high degree of private control, constant dependence on innovation, high demand for complex inputs, economic and infrastructure interdependence, constant connectivity, the absence of borders, high energy consumption, transversality, convergence in nodes, and ease of anonymization. This set of aspects makes it a volatile, insecure, complex, and ambiguous environment, with the potential to promote constant friction between multiple actors in the struggle for power.

It is worth noting that this configuration partially reduces the advantages traditionally associated with geography. Physical distance ceases to be an effective barrier to the projection of power. An agent located anywhere in the world can compromise the strategic systems of another State without crossing physical borders or employing conventional military means.

Thus, control of physical territory is no longer sufficient to guarantee strategic autonomy, making it necessary to control or influence the elements that sustain the functioning of the national informational ecosystem.

2.3 Cyber ​​sovereignty and the layers of state autonomy

Contemporary literature on cyber sovereignty seeks to address precisely this challenge of the Information Age. From this perspective, it is understood as the capacity of a State to exercise control over the layers that constitute cyberspace, as suggested by Deibert (2002).

In Moreno's view (2026), it represents the State's ability to act, with autonomy and independence, in the layers that make up cyberspace, generating intra- and extra-cyberspace effects, synergistically with the other projections of state sovereignty, ensuring the protection of its national interests, the promotion of its defense and security, and the preservation of its decisional freedom in the face of adverse influences.

Set Theory (Georg Cantor and Richard Dedekind, 1870) supports the idea that it is equivalent to the sum of cyber sovereignty in the cognitive, physical, and logical layers.

From this perspective, cognitive cyber sovereignty manifests itself in the struggle for collective consciousness and control of information. The State projects its capacity to protect, regulate, and influence the creation of narratives that underpin its political legitimacy, social cohesion, and cultural autonomy.

Regarding physical cyber sovereignty, it is more concrete in the application of the autonomy and independence of state power, as it essentially involves the control and protection of physical assets that support cyberspace. This assertion is partly supported by Mueller (2017), who argues that the physical location of servers determines the applicable jurisdiction and, with it, the scope of state sovereignty over digital flows.

When addressing logical cyber sovereignty, the lack of concreteness becomes relevant. It is in this layer that the sets of protocols, addressing systems, domain names, programs, and technical standards that enable communication and interaction between digital networks are identified. It manifests itself through the possibility of States shaping, regulating, and, in certain situations, dominating the logical systems that guarantee interconnectivity. Its geopolitical consequences are latent, insofar as protocols define the conditions of interoperability and may favour certain economic and political models to the detriment of others.

In this way, cyber sovereignty is the extension of classical sovereignty to the digital environment, in line with land, sea, air, and space sovereignty, but maintaining peculiarities that stem from the globalized character and the impossibility of establishing rigid limits.

Knowing its layers means knowing where the strengths and weaknesses lie, as well as the threats and opportunities that organize the information society.

In short, states that are excessively dependent on external infrastructures become vulnerable to disruptions, sanctions, and geopolitical pressures. Dependence on foreign technological solutions can significantly limit their freedom of action. It is noted that, in the Information Age, controlling narratives can be as strategic as maintaining territories.

Thus, the fundamental contribution of the theory of cyber sovereignty consists in demonstrating that state autonomy depends simultaneously on these three layers.

2.4 Cyber ​​Amazon as a national strategic asset

The Cyber ​​Amazon theory offers an important contribution to understanding the strategic dimension of the informational environment.

Inspired by the analogy with the physical Amazon and the concept of the Blue Amazon formulated by the Brazilian Navy (2004), this approach argues that the country possesses a strategic informational asset whose protection is fundamental to the preservation of national sovereignty.

This wealth is composed of data; digital infrastructures; scientific capabilities; artificial intelligence systems; computational resources; technological knowledge; specialized human capital; etc.

The Cyber ​​Amazon therefore represents the set of informational assets considered essential for the development and autonomy of the Brazilian State. As with the physical Amazon, the mere existence of this asset does not guarantee its protection.

The preservation of strategic resources requires surveillance capacity, state presence, governance, and defense mechanisms.

Thus, the Cyber ​​Amazon theory contributes to identifying what needs to be protected. However, it does not fully explain how this protection is constructed. In other words, it defines the strategic object, but not necessarily the mechanisms that ensure its survival.

This limitation opens space for the development of the Cybernetic Strategic Depth Theory.

2.5 The need for a Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth

At this point, it can be inferred that Classical Geopolitics explains the relationship between power and territory. The theory of Cyber ​​Sovereignty explains state autonomy over the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace. The theory of the Cyber ​​Amazon identifies the strategic informational assets that must be protected. However, a theory capable of explaining how states build strategic survival capacity in cyber environments remains absent.

This research argues that this gap can be filled through the concept of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

If classical strategic depth was measured by the physical distance between the borders and the vital centers of the state, cyber strategic depth should be understood as the functional distance between a digital threat and its ability to cause irreversible damage to the national system.

This functional distance is built through successive layers of protection, redundancy, resilience, and autonomy. Thus, the greater a state’s capacity to absorb, resist, and recover from threats directed at its cyber ecosystem, the greater its strategic depth in this area.

In this way, the proposed theory does not replace previous concepts. On the contrary, it acts as an integrating element.

This stance constitutes the conceptual foundation of the theory developed in this study and paves the way for the presentation of the analytical model and the empirical validation methodology.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research design

This research is applied in nature, with a predominantly qualitative approach and an exploratory-explanatory character. Its objective is to develop a new analytical framework aimed at understanding the strategic survival of States in the Information Age, through the formulation of the Theory of Cybernetic Strategic Depth (TCSD).

The choice of a qualitative approach is based on the nature of the problem investigated. As the concept of cybernetic strategic depth is not yet consolidated in the scientific literature, an investigation focused on conceptual construction and theoretical development is necessary.

At the same time, the research has an explanatory character because it seeks to identify causal mechanisms responsible for the relationship between digital dependence, strategic vulnerability, cyber sovereignty, and state resilience.

In this sense, it is situated at the intersection of Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, International Relations, Cybernetics, and Digital Governance.

3.2 Epistemological strategy

From an epistemological point of view, the study adopts a realist-critical perspective. It is assumed that the technological, economic, and political structures that make up cyberspace produce objective effects on the ability of states to exercise sovereignty and preserve their autonomy.

However, it is recognized that such structures are mediated by institutional, cultural, and cognitive factors that influence how risks and threats are perceived and addressed.

This approach allows for the integration of material and immaterial elements in the analysis of contemporary strategic depth. In this way, the research avoids both technological determinism and overly constructivist interpretations of cyber power.

3.3 The hypothetical-deductive method

The research employs the hypothetical-deductive method as the main strategy for theoretical construction. According to this approach, scientific knowledge is produced from the formulation of hypotheses that can be empirically verified.

Thus, the research begins with the identification of a theoretical gap observed in the specialized literature.

Although there are established theories on: territorial strategic depth, cyber sovereignty, cyber power, national resilience, and digital sovereignty, there is no explanatory model designed to understand how states build strategic depth in cyber environments.

From this gap, the following central hypothesis was formulated: the strategic survival of states in the Information Age depends more on the depth existing in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of their cyber ecosystems than on classical territorial depth.

This hypothesis guides the entire construction of the proposed theory.

3.4 The construction of the analytical model

The model was developed through the integration of concepts from different theoretical traditions.

From Classical Geopolitics, the logic of strategic depth was incorporated. From the theory of Cyber ​​Sovereignty, the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace were incorporated. From the literature on National Resilience, the notion of absorption and recovery capacity in the face of shocks was incorporated. From the theory of Cybernetic Amazonia, the notion of strategic informational assets was incorporated.

The combination of these elements resulted in the formulation of a new analytical category: Cybernetic Strategic Depth.

3.5 Operationalization of variables

To allow for future empirical validation of the theory, the concepts were converted into observable variables.

3.5.1 The Dependent Variable

- Cyber ​​Strategic Depth (CSD): Corresponds to the degree of structural capacity of a State to preserve the continuity of the exercise of National Power, cyber sovereignty, and decisional autonomy in the face of threats, disturbances, or shocks directed at its physical, logical, and cognitive layers.

It is not limited to the capacity to respond to specific incidents; it represents a systemic property resulting from the existence of mechanisms of redundancy, diversification, technological autonomy, cognitive defense, and institutional resilience that widen the functional distance between a threat and its capacity to produce irreversible strategic damage.

From this perspective, Cyber ​​Strategic Depth expresses the level of structural protection existing between the strategic informational assets of a State and the agents capable of compromising its political, economic, military, psychosocial, or scientific-technological stability.

The greater the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth, the greater the state's capacity to absorb impacts without significant loss of functionality; to resist attacks directed at critical infrastructures; to adapt to changes in the technological and geopolitical environment; recover strategic capabilities after incidents; and preserve cyber sovereignty and national autonomy.

Thus, it represents a State's structural capacity to maintain its sovereignty, decisional autonomy, and functional continuity through the construction of successive layers of protection, redundancy, technological autonomy, and resilience in the physical, logical, and cognitive dimensions of cyberspace.

3.5.2 The independent variables

- Physical Capacity (PC): Represents the robustness of the material infrastructure that supports cyberspace, being linked to its physical layer. It has materialized by the following indicators: National data centers; protected critical infrastructures; submarine cables; satellites; and energy production.

Table 1 Physical Capacity
Metric Indicator
National Data Centers Number and Installed Capacity
Protected Critical Infrastructures Percentage Protected
Energy Reliability Index
Submarine Cables Quantity and Redundancy
National Satellites Quantity and Operational Capacity

Source: Moreno, Wanderlino Junior.

The following hypothesis is formulated: The greater the physical capacity, the greater the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

- Logical Capacity (LC): Establishes technological autonomy related to information processing, being related to the logical layer. It is consolidated by the following indicators: National software production; artificial intelligence; cryptography; operating systems; and digital platforms.

Table 2 Logical Capacity
Metric Indicator
National software production Market share
Artificial Intelligence Scientific and technological production
Sovereign cryptography Existence of national solutions
Semiconductors Production capacity
Advanced computing Installed capacity

Source: Moreno, Wanderlino Junior.

The following hypothesis is formulated: The greater the logical capacity, the greater the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

- Cognitive Capacity (CC): Consolidates the social capacity to resist influence and manipulation operations, being directed to the cognitive layer. It materializes through the following indicators: Digital literacy; technological education; institutional trust; and resilience to disinformation.

Table 3 Cognitive Ability
Metric Indicator
Digital literacy National index
STEM education Percentage of the population
Institutional trust National surveys
Resilience to misinformation International indices
Cognitive defense Existence of public policies

Source: Moreno, Wanderlino Junior.

The following hypothesis is formulated: The greater the cognitive capacity, the greater the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

- External Technological Dependence (ETD): Represents the degree of vulnerability resulting from dependence on foreign technologies, observed through the following indicators: Dependence on foreign cloud; dependence on semiconductors; dependence on digital platforms; and dependence on external artificial intelligence models.

Table 4 External Technological Dependence
Metric Indicator
Cloud dependency Participation of external providers
AI dependency Use of foreign models
Semiconductor dependency Strategic imports
Digital platform dependency Market share
Operating system dependency Use in critical infrastructure

Source: Moreno, Wanderlino Junior.

The following hypothesis is formulated: The greater the external technological dependence, the lower the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

3.6 The validation method

To examine the empirical plausibility of the proposed theory, the Process Tracing method is employed. This approach is widely used in Strategic Studies and International Relations to identify causal mechanisms responsible for the occurrence of a given phenomenon.

The causal mechanism investigated in this research can be represented in the following ways:

High technological dependence generates strategic vulnerability, which indicates greater exposure to systemic threats. This context promotes a reduction in Cyber ​​Strategic Depth, generating less resilience capacity, which causes a reduction in cyber sovereignty.

Conversely, increased technological autonomy promotes the development of physical, logical, and cognitive depth. This set generates greater strategic resilience, contributing to the strengthening of cyber sovereignty and the strategic survival of the State.

Thus, the use of Process Tracing allows us to analyze not only observable results, but also the processes that lead to these results.

3.7 Case study selection

As a preliminary validation strategy, the Brazilian PIX ecosystem was selected, based on four criteria:

- Strategic relevance: PIX has become one of the main digital infrastructures in Brazil;

- Systemic dependence: Its operation directly affects millions of citizens, companies, and financial institutions;

- Data availability: The system has extensive public documentation and accessible statistical indicators; and

- Existence of critical events: The ecosystem has already been subjected to security incidents, disinformation campaigns, and operational challenges that allow us to observe the mechanisms predicted by the theory.

The analysis of PIX makes it possible to simultaneously evaluate the physical, logical, and cognitive dimensions of cyber strategic depth.

3.8 Research limitations

Like all theoretical research, this study has limitations. First, it is an initial conceptual formulation that lacks greater empirical validity. Secondly, the proposed operationalization for the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSD) should be refined in future research through the incorporation of quantitative indicators and historical series.

Finally, this investigation focuses primarily on the state dimension, not exploring in depth the role played by transnational technology corporations.

These limitations, however, do not compromise the theoretical contribution of the study, but indicate opportunities for future research agendas.

4. The Theory Of Cyber Strategic Depth

4.1 Conceptual foundation

The TCSD starts from the premise that digital transformation has produced a structural change in international competition and, therefore, in the mechanisms for preserving state sovereignty.

For centuries, strategic depth was understood as a property related to physical space. The survival of states depended on the ability to use geography as a protective instrument, absorbing threats through territorial distance, the existence of natural barriers, and the dispersion of power centers.

The Information Age has significantly changed this logic.

The growing dependence on digital infrastructures has reduced the relative importance of geographical distance and increased the relevance of informational ecosystems as central spaces of strategic competition.

In this context, strategic survival no longer depends exclusively on territorial depth and now requires the construction of depth in informational environments.

The TSBP emerges precisely to explain this phenomenon. The theory argues that the strategic survival capacity of States in the 21st century depends on building depth in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace.

4.2 The definition of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth (CSD)

The Cyber ​​Strategic Depth is defined as: The set of structural capabilities that allows a State to absorb, resist, adapt to, and recover from disruptions directed at its cyber ecosystem without significant loss of political autonomy, institutional functionality, or power projection capacity.

Unlike classical strategic depth, measured by territorial extent, cyber strategic depth is calculated by the functional resilience capacity of a cyber ecosystem.

In other words, it is the strategic distance between an informational threat and the ability of that threat to cause irreversible damage to national interests.

In short, the greater this functional distance, the greater the cyber strategic depth.

4.3 The foundations of the Theory

The CSD is based on four central assumptions.

- First (Information has become a strategic resource): The Industrial Age was marked by the centrality of material resources. The Information Age is characterized by the centrality of informational resources. Data, algorithms, artificial intelligence, computational capacity, and technological knowledge have come to play a role equivalent to that played by strategic natural resources in previous periods. Consequently, the protection of these elements has become a matter of national security.

- Second (Sovereignty has become multidimensional): Contemporary sovereignty can no longer be understood solely in absolute terms. It is therefore essential to divide the general concept of sovereignty into several dimensions that are linked to the territory in which they are applied. Therefore, it is necessary to admit that there are fractions of sovereignty that exert effects in the terrestrial, maritime, aerial, sidereal, and cybernetic spheres. Thus, the state's capacity to exercise authority increasingly depends on relative control over digital infrastructures, informational flows, and cognitive environments. It now simultaneously involves physical, logical, and cognitive dimensions.

- Third (Strategic vulnerability is determined by technological dependence): In the Information Age, a state's vulnerability does not stem solely from external threats. It also stems from the degree of existing technological dependence.

The greater the dependence on infrastructure, platforms, semiconductors, operating systems, or artificial intelligence models controlled by external actors, the lower the national strategic autonomy.

- Fourth (Resilience is a product of strategic depth): Resilience is not a spontaneous phenomenon. It results from the prior existence of redundancy, autonomy, diversification, and protection mechanisms. Thus, cyber strategic depth represents precisely the set of these capabilities.

4.4 The three layers of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth (CSD)

The theory proposes that cyber strategic depth is built upon three interdependent layers.

The physical layer constitutes the structural level of strategic depth. It corresponds to the material infrastructure responsible for the functioning of cyberspace, including data centers; telecommunications networks; submarine cables; satellites; energy systems; semiconductors; and strategic minerals. Consequently, physical depth depends on the capacity to protect, diversify, and redundancy these infrastructures.

A state that concentrates its critical systems in a few vulnerable points has low physical depth. On the other hand, a state that has energy redundancy, multiple communication routes, and distributed infrastructure have a greater capacity to absorb shocks.

The logical layer corresponds to the systems responsible for processing, storing, and circulating information, including software; operating systems; protocols; algorithms; digital platforms; and artificial intelligence systems.

Logical depth depends on technological autonomy. The greater the national capacity to develop and control critical technologies, the greater its strategic depth. Excessive reliance on foreign technologies creates structural vulnerabilities capable of compromising the decision-making autonomy of states.

The cognitive layer constitutes the most complex and strategic dimension of the theory, encompassing individuals; perceptions; beliefs; values; identities; and decision-making processes.

Historically, conflicts sought to destroy physical resources. However, in the Information Age, it becomes possible to directly influence the perception of individuals and institutions. Influence operations, disinformation campaigns, algorithmic manipulation, and cognitive warfare have become part of the repertoire of contemporary strategic disputes.

Thus, cognitive depth corresponds to a society's ability to resist these manipulation processes. A society capable of identifying disinformation, preserving institutional trust, and maintaining social cohesion exhibits high cognitive depth.

4.5 The mechanism of producing Cybernetic Strategic Depth (CSD)

The Theory of Cybernetic Strategic Depth argues that CSD is not a natural attribute of states, but the result of a continuous process of institutional, technological, and social construction.

Just as territorial strategic depth has historically been produced by geographic factors, military infrastructure, and logistical capacity, cyber strategic depth emerges from the combination of mechanisms capable of widening the functional distance between a threat and its ability to produce irreversible strategic damage.

The theory identifies four structuring mechanisms responsible for producing Cyber ​​Strategic Depth: redundancy, diversification, autonomy, and resilience. These mechanisms act simultaneously on the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace, forming successive protective barriers capable of reducing systemic vulnerabilities and preserving the continuity of National Power.

4.5.1 Redundancy

The redundancy constitutes the first mechanism for producing PEI (Public Equity Impact). It corresponds to the existence of alternative resources, systems, or capabilities capable of assuming critical functions when the main components are compromised.

In the physical dimension, redundancy manifests itself through the existence of multiple data centers, alternative telecommunications routes, contingency energy systems, and distributed infrastructure. In the logical dimension, it is expressed by the availability of alternative software, backup computing environments, and data recovery systems. In the cognitive dimension, it occurs through the plurality of informational channels and the existence of institutions capable of preserving public trust during periods of crisis.

The strategic function of redundancy is to prevent a single point of failure from compromising the functioning of the system. The greater the redundancy, the greater the State's ability to maintain operational continuity in the face of attacks, technical failures, or disasters.

4.5.2 Diversification

The diversification corresponds to the mechanism designed to reduce the concentration of strategic risks. Unlike redundancy, which seeks to create alternative systems for the same function, diversification seeks to avoid excessive dependence on a single supplier, technology, infrastructure, or resource source.

On the physical level, diversification involves a multiplicity of suppliers of equipment, energy sources, and international connectivity routes. On the logical level, it involves the use of different technological architectures, digital platforms, and software ecosystems. In the cognitive dimension, it manifests itself through the plurality of information sources and the institutional diversity responsible for shaping public opinion.

Diversification reduces vulnerability to disruptions resulting from economic sanctions, technological embargoes, systemic failures, or coercive actions by external actors. Consequently, it expands the State's freedom of action and strengthens its strategic autonomy.

4.5.3 Autonomy

The autonomy constitutes the central mechanism of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth. It corresponds to the ability of a State to develop, operate, maintain, and evolve critical technologies without depending entirely on external actors.

Physical autonomy is related to the control of critical infrastructure, energy resources, and communication systems. Logical autonomy refers to the national capacity to produce software, artificial intelligence, cryptographic systems, semiconductors, and strategic digital platforms. Cognitive autonomy concerns the capacity of society to produce its own political, economic, and cultural agendas without being heavily influenced by external actors.

Autonomy does not presuppose absolute self-sufficiency, a condition that is practically impossible in highly interdependent global technological systems. Its objective is to ensure that any external interruptions do not compromise the continuity of the State's essential functions.

From the perspective of the CSDI (technological cooperation and economics), excessive technological dependence represents the main factor reducing strategic depth, while technological autonomy constitutes its most important expansion factor.

4.5.4 Resilience

The resilience represents the operational result of the interaction between redundancy, diversification, and autonomy. It corresponds to the ability to absorb impacts, adapt to adverse conditions, and recover essential functionalities without significant loss of sovereignty or decision-making capacity.

At the physical layer, resilience manifests itself through the rapid restoration of critical infrastructures after incidents. At the logical layer, it is expressed by the recovery of compromised systems and the continuity of information processing. At the cognitive layer, it translates into the ability of society to preserve institutional trust and resist influence and disinformation operations.

Resilience does not eliminate vulnerabilities, but it reduces their capacity to produce lasting strategic effects. In this way, it constitutes the practical expression of the strategic depth built by the other mechanisms.

4.5.5 The process of forming Cyber ​​Strategic Depth

The theory proposes that Cyber ​​Strategic Depth emerges from the cumulative interaction of these four mechanisms. Redundancy reduces the probability of collapse; diversification reduces the concentration of risks; autonomy reduces external dependence; and resilience ensures the capacity for recovery.

The combined effect of these mechanisms produces successive layers of protection that widen the functional distance between a threat and its ability to compromise the continuity of National Power. The more developed these mechanisms, the greater the State's cyber strategic depth.

The CSD constitutes the accumulated result of structural capabilities that allow the State to resist, adapt, and survive in an environment characterized by increasing technological competition, digital dependence, and informational vulnerability.

4.6 The law of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth

The Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth culminates in the formulation of its central causal proposition, called the Law of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth (LCSD). This law synthesizes the explanatory mechanism of the theory by establishing the relationship between the State's structural capabilities, technological autonomy, informational resilience, and strategic survival in the Information Age.

Unlike classical strategic depth, whose effectiveness was predominantly associated with territorial extent and the existence of geographical barriers, cyber strategic depth is determined by a state’s ability to build successive layers of protection, redundancy, autonomy, and resilience in its informational ecosystem.

The Law of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth can be expressed as follows:

A State's strategic survival capacity in the Information Age is directly proportional to the degree of depth existing in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of its cyber ecosystem and inversely proportional to its level of external technological dependence.

This formulation establishes a causal relationship between national capabilities and strategic survival. The theory argues that a state’s autonomy does not stem exclusively from the possession of material resources or the extent of its territory, but from the ability to protect, control, and sustain the systems responsible for the production, processing, circulation, and use of information.

The Law of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth assumes that cyberspace has become an essential dimension of contemporary sovereignty. In this environment, strategic vulnerability is determined not only by physical exposure to external threats, but also by technological dependence, institutional fragility, and society's susceptibility to informational manipulation processes.

Consequently, strategic survival ceases to be explained solely by territorial defense capabilities and begins to depend on the structural robustness of the national informational ecosystem.

4.6.1 The causal structure of the law

The LCSD proposes that strategic survival results from a cumulative process of strengthening national capabilities.

The first stage corresponds to the construction of physical, logical, and cognitive capabilities. These capabilities form the structural basis of cyber sovereignty.

The second stage corresponds to the production of strategic depth through mechanisms of redundancy, diversification, autonomy, and resilience.

The third stage corresponds to expanding the capacity to absorb, resist, adapt to, and recover from systemic threats.

The result of this process is the preservation of cyber sovereignty, decisional autonomy, and the continuity of National Power.

External technological dependence acts as a reducing variable of strategic depth. The greater the dependence on digital platforms, semiconductors, operating systems, cloud computing services, or artificial intelligence models controlled by external actors, the lower the strategic autonomy of the State. In addition, the greater its vulnerability to mechanisms of technological coercion, economic sanctions, or systemic disruptions.

4.6.2 The principle of functional distance

The main innovation of the LCSD (law on strategic cybersecurity) consists of replacing the classic concept of geographic distance with that of functional distance.

In traditional geopolitics, strategic depth was measured by the physical distance between borders and vital centers of power. In the Information Age, however, a threat can cross continents in seconds and directly affect critical infrastructure without any territorial displacement.

Thus, strategic depth is defined by the functional distance between a threat and its capacity to produce irreversible damage to the national system.

The greater the number of institutional, technological, cognitive, and operational barriers that a threat needs to overcome to compromise national strategic interests, the greater the cyber strategic depth of the State.

4.6.3 The corollaries of the law

Five fundamental corollaries are derived from the LCSD:

Corollary 1: States with high technological autonomy tend to exhibit greater cyber strategic depth;

Corollary 2: States capable of simultaneously controlling the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace exhibit greater strategic survivability;

Corollary 3: External technological dependence reduces strategic depth, even in countries with high physical infrastructure;

Corollary 4: Strategic resilience is a consequence of previously built strategic depth and not its primary cause; and

Corollary 5: In the Information Age, the international distribution of power tends to favour states that possess greater cyber strategic depth.

4.6.4 The theoretical scope of the law

The LCSD does not intend to replace classical theories of geopolitics or strategy. Its contribution consists of expanding these approaches to a context characterized by the centrality of information, connectivity, and technological competition.

Just as territorial depth was one of the foundations of the survival of states in the Industrial Age, the results suggest that cyber strategic depth may constitute a relevant factor for the preservation of state sovereignty in the Information Age.

From this perspective, the LCSD constitutes the central explanatory principle of the CSDI, allowing us to understand why some states manage to preserve their autonomy in the face of technological and informational shocks, while others remain structurally vulnerable to digital dependence and cyber coercion.

4.7 Cyber ​​Strategic Depth as a new projection of National Power

The main contribution of CSDI is to expand the classical theory of strategic depth to the context of the Information Age.

Strategic depth ceases to be interpreted exclusively as a geographical attribute and begins to be understood as a systemic capacity for resistance.

The theory proposes that CSDI constitutes a new projection of National Power, capable of simultaneously influencing sovereignty; national security; economic competitiveness; institutional stability; innovation capacity; and the international projection of the State.

From this perspective, States that manage to build physical, logical, and cognitive depth will be better able to preserve their autonomy in an environment characterized by increasing technological and informational competition.

CSDI thus offers a conceptual framework designed to understand strategic survival in the Information Age, in the same way that classical Geopolitics sought to understand state survival in the Industrial Age.

This formulation constitutes the theoretical core of this research and underpins the empirical analyses developed in the subsequent sections.

5. The Cyber Strategic Depth Index (CSDI)

5.1 The rationale behind the index

One of the main limitations of contemporary strategic theories lies in the difficulty of transforming abstract concepts into observable and comparable variables. Although concepts such as national power, digital sovereignty, national resilience, and technological autonomy are widely used in the specialized literature, their measurement often remains dependent on qualitative assessments.

The Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory proposes to overcome this limitation through the creation of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSDI).

The objective of CSDI is to provide an analytical instrument capable of measuring, comparing, and monitoring the capacity of States to build strategic depth in their cyber ecosystems.

It allows for the assessment of the degree of preparedness of States to face threats directed at digital infrastructures, technological systems, and cognitive environments. Furthermore, it makes it possible to identify structural vulnerabilities that may compromise national sovereignty and autonomy.

The construction of the index is directly based on the fundamentals of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory, especially on the interaction between the physical, logical, and cognitive dimensions of cyberspace.

5.2 The conceptual structure of the CSDI

The CSDI is composed of four major dimensions.

- Physical Dimension (PD): Assesses the robustness of the material infrastructure responsible for the functioning of the national informational ecosystem;

- Logical Dimension (LD): Assesses technological autonomy and the capacity for developing strategic digital systems;

- Cognitive Dimension (CD): Assesses society's ability to resist informational manipulation and preserve its decisional autonomy; and

- External Technological Dependence (DT): Measures the level of susceptibility that comes from dependence on technologies controlled by external agents.

While the first three dimensions contribute positively to strategic depth, technological dependence exerts a negative influence on the index.

The physical dimension represents the structural basis of cyber strategic depth. It corresponds to the material infrastructure responsible for supporting national digital flows.

The evaluation of this dimension will be carried out using the following indicators:

a. Telecommunications Infrastructure

- National coverage of communication networks;

- Data traffic capacity; and

- Diversity of connectivity routes.

b. Data Centers

- Number of strategic data centers;

- National storage capacity; and

- Geographic distribution of the infrastructure.

c. Energy Infrastructure

- Reliability of the electrical system;

- Redundancy capacity; and

- Energy resilience.

d. Space Infrastructure

- Own satellites; and

- National positioning and observation systems.

e. Submarine Cables

- Number of international connections; and

- Diversification of communication routes.

The logical dimension measures the national capacity to control the technological mechanisms responsible for the processing and circulation of information.

The proposed indicators include:

a. National Software Production

- Participation of the national industry; and

- Capacity for developing critical systems.

b. Artificial Intelligence

- Investments in AI;

- Scientific production; and

- National innovation ecosystems.

c. Cryptography

- Development of proprietary cryptographic solutions.

d. Advanced Computing

- Supercomputing;

- Quantum computing; and

- High-performance processing infrastructure.

e. Digital Platforms

- Existence of relevant national platforms; and

- Capacity to reduce dependence external companies.

The cognitive dimension represents the main innovation of the Cybernetic Strategic Depth Theory. Historically, indicators of power have focused on material resources.

The CSDI (theory of strategic and cognitive development) starts from the understanding that a society's ability to resist informational manipulation has become a strategic factor.

The proposed indicators include:

a. Digital Literacy

- The population's ability to use digital technologies critically.

b. Scientific and Technological Education

- Training in STEM areas; and

- Production of qualified human capital.

c. Institutional Trust

- Levels of trust in public institutions.

d. Resilience to Misinformation

- Ability to identify false information; and

- Existence of verification mechanisms.

e. Cognitive Defense

- National strategies aimed at protecting the informational environment.

It should be noted that the scoring of the dimension’s ranges from 0 to 100.

Technological dependence constitutes a reducing variable of the index. The central hypothesis of the theory argues that strategic autonomy decreases as dependence on critical technologies controlled by external actors increases.

The indicators include:

a. Cloud Computing Dependence

- Participation of foreign providers in the storage and processing of national data.

b. Semiconductor Dependence

- National capacity to produce strategic components.

c. Digital Platform Dependence

- Concentration of digital services in foreign companies.

d. Artificial Intelligence Dependence

- Predominant use of AI models developed outside the country.

e. Operating System Dependence

- Degree of use of foreign software in critical systems.

The technological dependence score ranges from 0 to 100. The higher this score, the lower the cybersecurity strategic depth.

To operationalize the central concepts of the CSDI, its analytical matrix was developed, which allows its use in comparative studies, national strategic evaluations, and future quantitative research.

The matrix establishes the relationship between the structuring components of the theory, the observable causal mechanisms, the empirical indicators, and their effects on the strategic survival of States.

Its main function is to transform the abstract concepts of CSDI into analytical categories that can be observed, measured, and compared.

Table 5 Analytical Matrix
Strategic Dimension Strategic Objective Main Components Empirical Indicators Associated Associated Vulnerabilities Impact on Strategic Depth
Physical Ensure operational continuity Critical infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, data centers, satellites. Energy capacity, redundancy, connectivity, protected critical infrastructure Physical attacks, sabotage, service interruption High
Logical Ensure technological autonomy Software, AI, cryptography, digital platforms, semiconductors National technological production, investment in R&D, digital autonomy External technological dependence Very High
Cognitive Ensure social and institutional stability Digital education, institutional trust, cognitive defense Digital literacy rates, public trust, resilience to disinformation Cognitive warfare, disinformation, informational manipulation Very High
Technological Dependence Reduce strategic vulnerability Cloud, hardware, digital platforms, foreign AI Participation of external suppliers in critical sectors Sanctions, technological disruption, economic coercion Negative

Source: Moreno, Wanderlino Junior.

5.3 The mathematical formulation of the CSDI

As the CSDI states, the three layers of cyberspace are interdependent, and a serious deficiency in any one of them reduces the strategic depth of the system.

CSDI = (0.30PC + 0.30LC + 0.30CC) - (0.10DT)

Where:

- CSDI = Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index;

- PC = Physical Capability;

- LC= Logical Capability;

- CC = Cognitive Capability; and

- DT = External Technological Dependence.

Being:

- PC, LC, and CC normalized between 0 and 1;

- DT normalized between 0 and 1;

The mathematical formulation of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSDI) was designed to reflect the central assumptions of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory (CSDT). The model is based on the premise that a State's strategic depth results from the balanced interaction between three structuring dimensions of cyberspace: physical capacity, logical capacity, and cognitive capacity.

For this reason, an equivalent weight of 30% was assigned to each of these dimensions. The symmetrical distribution of weights stems from the understanding that none of them is sufficient, in isolation, to ensure cyber sovereignty or the strategic survival of the State. Weakness in any of the layers can compromise the resilience of the system as a whole, in accordance with the principle of the vulnerability of the weakest link observed in complex systems.

The variable External Technological Dependence (DT) received a negative weight of 10%, since it does not constitute a dimension that generates strategic depth, but rather a factor that reduces national autonomy. Its inclusion aims to capture the impact of vulnerabilities arising from dependence on technologies, platforms, semiconductors, cloud computing services, and artificial intelligence models controlled by external actors.

Thus, the mathematical structure of the index allows the gains produced by physical, logical, and cognitive capabilities to be partially reduced by the effects of external technological dependence, reflecting the central hypothesis of the theory that technological autonomy expands strategic depth, while technological dependence reduces it.

The adopted configuration generates a theoretical range of variation between -10 and 90 points. The maximum value is reached when all three capabilities reach their maximum score, and external technological dependence is non-existent. The minimum value occurs when the structuring capabilities are zero and external technological dependence reaches its maximum level. This characteristic does not represent a limitation of the index, but a deliberate methodological choice intended to highlight that technological dependence exerts a corrosive effect on cyber strategic depth.

For international comparative purposes and future quantitative applications, it is recommended that the CSDI be interpreted according to previously defined classification ranges or, alternatively, converted to a normalized scale of 0 to 100 points, without prejudice to its original theoretical logic.

This stance is based on three central arguments:

a. Structural equivalence: The physical layer provides the material infrastructure necessary for the functioning of the cyber ecosystem; the logical layer provides the technological mechanisms responsible for processing and circulating information; and the cognitive layer provides social legitimacy, institutional trust, and the ability to resist influence operations.

None of these dimensions is sufficient in isolation to guarantee cyber sovereignty.

A state may possess advanced infrastructure but remain vulnerable if it is technologically dependent on external actors. Similarly, it may possess high technological autonomy but be fragile in the face of disinformation campaigns capable of compromising its political stability.

Assigning equivalent weights reflects this condition of structural interdependence.

b. The principle of vulnerability of the "Weakest Link": The literature on the resilience of complex systems demonstrates that the robustness of a structure depends on its most vulnerable component. In the Information Age, a collapse in any of the three layers can produce systemic effects, such as:

- Attacks on critical infrastructures compromise the physical layer;

- Dependence on foreign software compromises the logical layer;

- Influence operations compromise the cognitive layer.

Consequently, there is insufficient theoretical basis to privilege one dimension over the others in the initial formulation of the index.

c. Consistency with the Theory of Cyber ​​Sovereignty: The tripartite division between physical, logical, and cognitive layers derives directly from the literature on cyber sovereignty and cyberspace governance. The CSDI expands this structure by transforming it into an explanatory mechanism for strategic survival.

Maintaining equivalent weights preserves the consistency between the theoretical model and its empirical operationalization.

The variable External Technological Dependence (DT) receives a negative weight, as it does not represent a constitutive dimension of strategic depth, but a factor that reduces national autonomy. Its inclusion stems from the hypothesis that technological dependence functions as a transversal vulnerability capable of limiting the positive effects of other capabilities.

A state may have high physical infrastructure, good cognitive capacity, reasonable technological development, but remain vulnerable if it heavily depends on foreign semiconductors, external cloud providers, foreign operating systems, and digital platforms controlled by other countries.

The choice of a negative weight for technological dependence allows it not to completely negate the gains produced by the other dimensions but ensures that it exerts a significant influence on the result.

Table 6 Weight and scoring range of the layers
Dimension Weight (%) Score Range
Physical 30 0–100
Logical 30 0–100
Cognitive 30 0–100
DT -10 0–100

Source: Moreno, Wanderlino Junior.

The following sources were used for data collection, indexed to the database linked to the index:

- Physical Dimension:

International Telecommunication Union (ITU);

World Bank Data;

GSMA Intelligence;

International Energy Agency (IEA); and

International Data Corporation (IDC).

- Logical Dimension:

UNESCO Science Report;

WIPO Global Innovation Index;

Stanford AI Index; and

OECD Digital Economy Outlook.

- Cognitive Dimension:

OECD Education Database;

Reuters Digital News Report;

Edelman Trust Barometer; and

UN eGovernment Survey.

- Technological Dependence:

Gartner;

Statista;

Semiconductor Industry Association;

World Semiconductor Trade Statistics.

The proposed weights should be understood as an initial theoretical formulation. In future research, they can be refined through quantitative techniques such as:

- Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA);

- Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA);

- Principal Component Analysis (PCA);

- Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP); and

- Structural Equation Modelling (SEM).

These procedures will allow us to empirically verify whether the three dimensions effectively have an equivalent contribution to cyber strategic depth or whether certain national contexts require differentiated weightings.

Thus, the weights adopted in this version of the theory have a heuristic and theoretically grounded character, serving as a starting point for the empirical validation of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory.

5.4 The CSD clustering

The Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index ranges from 0 to 100 points. The proposed classification represents not only a statistical division of the scale, but increasing levels of cyber autonomy, resilience, and sovereignty.

Table 7 Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Classification Scale
Category Classification Strategic Characteristics Role in the Cyber ​​Ecosystem
-10 a 14,9 Critical A state highly dependent on external technologies, with low capacity to protect critical infrastructure, reduced technological autonomy, and high cognitive vulnerability. Assisted Survival (Vulnerable)
15 a 29,9 Very Low A state with serious structural limitations in the physical, logical, and cognitive dimensions, exhibiting high exposure to technological and informational risks. Dependent Survival (Dependent)
30 a 44,9 Low A state with limited cyber capabilities, low technological autonomy, and a reduced capacity to absorb systemic shocks. Restricted Autonomy (Emerging Dependent)
45 a 59,9 Medium The state is in the process of consolidating strategic capabilities, possessing significant infrastructure, but is still dependent on external actors in critical sectors. Partial (Emerging) Autonomy
60 a 74,9 High A resilient state, with significant autonomy in strategic areas, a high capacity for recovery from crises, and reduced technological dependence. Strategic Autonomy (Resilient)
75 a 90 Very High A consolidated cyber power, characterized by high technological autonomy, strong innovative capacity, institutional robustness, and low systemic vulnerability. Information Leadership (Cyber ​​Power)

Source: Moreno, Wanderlino Junior.

The definition of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSDI) ranges stems directly from the Law of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth (LCSD), according to which a state's strategic survival capacity in the Information Age is proportional to the depth existing in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of its cyber ecosystem and inversely proportional to its level of external technological dependence.

The proposed classification represents not only a quantitative scale but also a qualitative typology of the levels of cyber autonomy, resilience, and sovereignty achieved by states.

a. Critical Range (-10 to 14.9): States classified in this range have insufficient cyber strategic depth to ensure the continuity of their essential functions in the face of technological, cyber, or informational shocks. They are characterized by high dependence on foreign technologies, low capacity to protect critical infrastructures, reduced technological autonomy, and limited cognitive resilience. Under these conditions, the State's strategic survival often depends on external support, whether through international alliances, technological assistance, or support from transnational corporations. a. Incident response capacity is reduced, making the country highly susceptible to technological coercion, disruptions to essential services, and influence operations;

b. Very Low Range (15 to 29.9): States in this range have incipient cyber capabilities and face significant structural limitations. Although they have some digital infrastructure and basic governance mechanisms, they remain highly dependent on technologies, platforms, and services controlled by external actors. The existing strategic depth is insufficient to guarantee full decisional autonomy. In systemic crisis situations, the capacity for absorption and recovery tends to be limited, increasing national vulnerability to cyberattacks, technological disruptions, and disinformation campaigns;

c. Low Range (30 to 44.9): This range includes States that have begun the process of strengthening their physical, logical, and cognitive capabilities, but still have significant vulnerabilities in strategic sectors. The digital infrastructure is functional, but technological autonomy remains limited. Although they can respond to less intense incidents, dependence on external technologies continues to represent a relevant risk factor. These countries have limited capacity to project power in cyberspace and face difficulties in reducing long-term structural vulnerabilities;

d. Medium Range (45 to 59.9): States classified in this category have consolidating cyber strategic depth. They possess relatively robust infrastructure, more resilient institutions, and moderate levels of technological autonomy. However, they remain dependent on external actors in critical areas such as semiconductors, cloud computing, digital platforms, or artificial intelligence. The capacity to absorb and recover from shocks is significant, allowing for the preservation of essential state functions. However, vulnerabilities persist that could compromise strategic autonomy in scenarios of prolonged technological competition;

e. High Range (60 to 74.9): This range represents states that have achieved a high degree of cyber strategic depth. Their physical, logical, and cognitive capabilities are widely developed, providing high resilience to systemic threats. These countries have significant autonomy in strategic technological sectors, advanced mechanisms for protecting critical infrastructures, and a high capacity for cognitive defense. Although they still maintain some degree of international technological interdependence, this dependence does not compromise their freedom of action or their ability to respond to crises; and

f. Very High Range (75 to 90): States classified in this range constitute the main cyber powers of the international system. They possess high technological autonomy, mastery of critical technologies, strong innovation capacity, highly resilient infrastructure, and advanced cognitive defense mechanisms. Their cyber strategic depth allows them to absorb, resist, and recover from complex threats without significantly compromising national sovereignty, institutional stability, or the continuity of National Power. In addition to protecting their own interests, these States exert influence over the global governance of cyberspace, establish international technological standards, and project informational power on a global scale. From the perspective of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory, this category represents the highest stage of strategic maturity achievable in the Information Age.

The classification ranges of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSDI) were defined to represent six successive stages of maturity of the cyber strategic depth of States, reflecting different levels of technological autonomy, informational resilience, and capacity to preserve cyber sovereignty:

- Critical Condition (-10 to 14.9);

- Very Low Strategic Depth (15 to 29.9);

- Low Strategic Depth (30 to 44.9);

- Medium Strategic Depth (45 to 59.9);

- High Strategic Depth (60 to 74.9); and

- Very High Strategic Depth (75 to 90).

The definition of these ranges stems directly from the mathematical formulation of the CSDI and the central assumptions of the Theory of Cybernetic Strategic Depth (TCSD). As the index assigns equivalent weights to physical, logical, and cognitive capabilities and incorporates external technological dependence as a reducing factor, its structure seeks to reflect the balance between autonomy, resilience, and vulnerability in the national cyber ecosystem.

The existence of a lower critical range allows for the identification of States whose technological dependence and structural fragility significantly compromise their ability to guarantee the continuity of the essential functions of National Power. Conversely, the upper range represents States capable of building high levels of technological autonomy, protection of critical infrastructures, institutional resilience, and cognitive defense.

The limitation of the upper category to the 75-to-90-point range stems from the index's own architecture. Considering that technological dependence negatively influences the result and that achieving high levels of simultaneous physical, logical, and cognitive capabilities is a rare condition in the international system, maximum values ​​naturally become more difficult to achieve.

This characteristic preserves the discriminatory power of CSDI and increases its adherence to the real distribution of cyber capabilities observed among contemporary States. Consequently, the classification ceases to represent a simple quantitative scale and becomes a strategic typology of cyber maturity, capable of expressing different stages of development of cyber sovereignty and cyber strategic depth.

In this way, the proposed scale becomes an analytical component of the TCSD itself, allowing for a comparative interpretation of the positioning of States in the contemporary informational environment and assessing their capacity to absorb, resist, adapt to, and recover from threats directed at the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace.

To strengthen the empirical validity of the theory, the model will be applied comparatively to the cases of the United States, China, Estonia, the European Union, and Brazil, using the indicators and methodological procedures established by CSDI. The selection of these cases seeks to encompass different levels of technological development, distinct digital sovereignty strategies, and varying degrees of cyber autonomy, allowing for an assessment of the explanatory power of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory in diverse geopolitical contexts.

a. UNITED STATES

a.1 Physical Capacity (PC = 95)

The United States possesses the largest digital infrastructure in the world:

- leadership in data centers;

- robust energy infrastructure;

- extensive network of submarine cables;

- advanced space system; and

- protection of critical infrastructure.

a.2 Logical Capacity (LC = 98)

Global leadership in:

- Artificial Intelligence;

- cloud computing;

- software;

- semiconductors; and

- global digital platforms.

Companies such as Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, Meta, and Nvidia represent strategic national assets.

a.3 Cognitive Capacity (CC = 80)

Strengths:

- university excellence;

- high scientific output; and

- strong culture of innovation.

Weaknesses:

- political polarization; and

- high exposure to misinformation.

a.4 Technological Dependence (DT = 15)

- Low external dependence.

The US controls a large part of critical global technologies.

Result: CSDI = (0.30×95) + (0.30×98) + (0.30×80) − (0.10×15) = 80.4

Classification: Very High Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

The United States is in the category of Consolidated Cyber ​​Power, characterized by:

- High technological autonomy;

- Dominance of key critical global technologies;

- Leadership in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and cloud computing;

- Strong innovation capacity;

- Broad resilience of digital infrastructures;

- High capacity for informational power projection.

The main limiting factor for an even higher score is the cognitive dimension (CC = 80), impacted by internal political polarization, informational fragmentation, and increasing exposure to disinformation campaigns. Despite this, the country maintains one of the greatest cyber strategic depths in the international system.

b. CHINA

b.1 Physical Capability (PC = 90)

China has made massive investments in:

- digital infrastructure;

- 5G networks;

- satellites;

- data centers; and

- energy.

b.2 Logical Capability (LC = 92)

It possesses:

- national platforms (Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu);

- an AI ecosystem;

- growing semiconductor production; and

- its own digital payment systems.

b.3 Cognitive Capability (CC = 78)

Strong state coordination mechanisms, with less vulnerability to external influence campaigns.

b.4 Technological Dependence (DT = 20)

Although it has significantly reduced its dependence, it still faces limitations in:

- advanced semiconductors; and

- cutting-edge lithography.

Result: CSDI = (0.30×90) + (0.30×92) + (0.30×78) − (0.10×20) = 76.0

Classification: Very High Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

China falls into the category of Consolidated Cyber ​​Power, exhibiting high cyber strategic depth due to:

- Extensive digital and energy infrastructure;

- World leadership in 5G networks;

- Strong space capability;

- Robust national technological ecosystem;

- Proprietary digital platforms;

- Growing autonomy in artificial intelligence;

- Sovereign digital financial systems;

- High state coordination of technological policies.

The main limiting factor in China's score remains associated with residual dependence on critical cutting-edge technologies, especially in the production of advanced semiconductors and lithography equipment, segments still subject to external technological constraints.

Even so, China demonstrates a high degree of strategic autonomy and capacity to absorb technological shocks, positioning itself as one of the main cyber powers in the international system.

c. ESTONIA

c.1 Physical Capacity (PC = 82)

Despite its small territory, it presents:

- highly integrated digital infrastructure;

- high connectivity; and

- distributed government systems.

c.2 Logical Capacity (LC = 80)

It possesses:

- national digital identity;

- government interoperability; and

- advanced digital government.

c.3 Cognitive Capacity (CC = 92)

This constitutes its main strategic strength, consolidated after the 2007 attacks, based on:

- digital education;

- cybersecurity culture; and

- cognitive defense.

c.4 Technological Dependence (DT = 35)

It remains dependent on technologies produced outside the country.

Result: CSDI = (0.30×82) + (0.30×80) + (0.30×92) − (0.10×35) = 72.7

Classification: High Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

Estonia is a unique case in the application of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory. Despite its small territorial size and limited material capacity compared to major powers, the country has developed one of the most resilient digital ecosystems in the world.

Its main strategic advantage lies in its Cognitive Capability (CC = 92), the highest among the cases analyzed so far. The cyberattacks suffered in 2007 spurred the construction of a national cybersecurity culture based on:

- Comprehensive digital education;

- High institutional trust;

- Cognitive defense mechanisms;

- Ongoing training of the population;

- Integration between government, society and the private sector.

In the logical dimension, Estonia stands out for its national digital identity, interoperability between government systems, and extensive digitization of public services. In the physical dimension, it has a highly connected and distributed infrastructure, although on a smaller scale than the major powers.

The main limiting factor of the index remains external technological dependence (DT = 35), especially in relation to advanced hardware, semiconductors, and some global technological platforms.

d. EUROPEAN UNION

d.1 Physical Capacity (PC = 85)

The EU has:

- advanced digital infrastructure;

- high connectivity; and

- modern energy systems.

d.2 Logical Capacity (CL = 75)

Despite its high scientific capacity, it has:

- few global digital platforms;

- technological dependence on the USA; and

- increasing dependence on foreign AI.

d.3 Cognitive Capacity (CC = 80)

High levels of:

- education;

- institutional trust; and

- combating disinformation.

d.4 Technological Dependence (DT = 40)

Moderate dependence on:

- cloud;

- AI;

- digital platforms.

Result: CSDI = (0.30×85) + (0.30×75) + (0.30×80) − (0.10×40) = 68.0

Classification: High Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

The European Union presents high cyber strategic depth, supported by a robust physical infrastructure, high educational levels, and an advanced regulatory framework focused on data protection, digital security, and combating disinformation.

Its main strength lies in the combination of:

- High digital connectivity;

- Modern energy infrastructure;

- Strong scientific capacity;

- Stable institutions;

- Policies for protecting the informational environment. In the cognitive dimension, the European Union maintains high levels of digital literacy, institutional trust, and mechanisms to combat disinformation, factors that contribute to its social and political resilience.

However, its main vulnerability lies in the logical dimension. Despite its scientific and technological excellence, the European Union has a limited presence among the major global digital platforms and maintains a significant dependence on technologies developed mainly by the United States. This dependence manifests itself in strategic areas such as:

- Cloud computing;

- Artificial intelligence;

- Operating systems;

- Digital platforms;

- Large-scale digital services.

Consequently, External Technological Dependence (DT = 40) significantly reduces its cyber strategic depth.

e. BRAZIL

e.1 Physical Capacity (PC = 70)

Strengths:

- Robust digital financial system;

- PIX;

- GOV.BR; and

- Favorable energy matrix.

Weaknesses:

- Concentration of critical infrastructure; and

- Technological dependence.

e.2 Logical Capacity (LC = 55)

Main limitations:

- Low semiconductor production;

- Reduced presence in advanced AI; and

- Absence of global digital platforms.

e.3 Cognitive Capacity (CC = 68)

Strengths:

- Expansion of digital inclusion; and

- Relevant academic capacity.

Weaknesses:

- High exposure to misinformation; and

- Low institutionalization of cognitive defense.

e.4 Technological Dependence (DT = 70)

High dependence on:

- Cloud;

- AI;

- Semiconductors;

- Digital platforms.

Result: CSDI = (0.30×70) + (0.30×55) + (0.30×68) − (0.10×70) = 50.9

Classification: Medium Cyber ​​Strategic Depth

Brazil presents an intermediate cyber strategic depth, placing it in the category of States in the process of consolidating strategic capabilities. The result demonstrates that the country possesses relevant assets for building cyber sovereignty but still faces structural limitations that restrict its technological autonomy.

In the physical dimension, the following stand out:

- National digital financial system;

- PIX ecosystem;

- The GOV.BR platform;

- Broad renewable energy matrix;

- Growing connectivity infrastructure.

These elements provide an important basis for the resilience of the Brazilian digital ecosystem.

In the logical dimension, however, the main limitations are found. The country presents:

- Low semiconductor production capacity;

- Reduced participation in the global artificial intelligence race;

- Absence of global digital platforms;

- Significant dependence on foreign software and technological infrastructure.

In the cognitive dimension, Brazil has a relevant academic community and growing digital inclusion, but faces challenges related to the dissemination of misinformation, social polarization, and limited institutionalization of permanent cognitive defense policies.

The main factor reducing the index is the high External Technological Dependence (DT = 70), one of the highest among the cases analyzed. This dependence manifests itself in strategic sectors such as:

- Cloud computing;

- Artificial intelligence;

- Semiconductors;

- Operating systems;

- Global digital platforms.

5.5 Comparative analysis of CSDI results

The application of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSDI) to the United States, China, Estonia, the European Union, and Brazil allows for the identification of relevant structural patterns for understanding the distribution of power in the Information Age. From the perspective of the Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth (TCSD), the results suggest that contemporary strategic competition is progressively shifting from physical geography to informational geography, in which technological autonomy, institutional resilience, and cognitive defense play a central role in preserving the sovereignty and defense capabilities of states.

The analysis reveals that the main explanatory variable for the observed differences is not territorial size or population, but the ability to control critical technologies and reduce external dependencies. In all cases evaluated, the highest levels of strategic depth are associated with high technological autonomy and the existence of robust cognitive defense mechanisms.

The United States occupies the first position in the CSDI ranking, reflecting its status as the leading technological power in the international system. Its strategic advantage stems from its dominance of the logical layer of cyberspace, supported by leading companies in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cloud computing, and global digital platforms.

The main vulnerability identified lies in the growing internal political polarization and the expansion of the surface area exposed to influence and disinformation operations.

Based on the analysis of the knowledge generated by the CSDI study, the following aspects are recommended for US public policy:

- Strengthen national cognitive defense programs;

- Expand protection mechanisms against foreign influence operations;

- Reinforce the security of semiconductor supply chains;

- Expand investments in quantum computing and advanced artificial intelligence;

- Increase the protection of critical infrastructure against hybrid attacks; and

- Promote greater integration between national security, the private sector, and the scientific community.

Regarding China, it has consolidated itself as the main strategic challenger to the United States in the cyber domain. Its investments in digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, digital financial systems, and technological production have significantly expanded its strategic depth.

Its main vulnerability remains the associated with residual dependence on critical technologies related to the production of advanced semiconductors and lithography equipment.

Recommendations for improving public policies in the sector:

- Accelerate self-sufficiency in next-generation semiconductors;

- Increase investments in basic research and disruptive innovation;

- Reduce vulnerabilities in global strategic supply chains;

- Strengthen protection mechanisms against technological sabotage;

- Expand training programs for specialists in critical technologies; and

- Consolidate national artificial intelligence ecosystems.

Regarding Estonia, the country represents the most efficient case of converting limited resources into high cyber strategic depth. Its main advantage stems from the combination of advanced digital governance, high digital literacy, and a strong cybersecurity culture.

Its structural vulnerability is related to its limited economic scale and external technological dependence for certain strategic components.

Recommendations for public policies in the sector:

- Maintain permanent digital education and cognitive defense programs;

- Increase the redundancy of critical digital infrastructures; - Strengthen strategic partnerships within NATO and the European Union;

- Expand national cyber defense capabilities;

- Develop mechanisms for governmental continuity in crisis environments; and

- Invest in emerging technologies to reduce external dependencies.

The European Union has high strategic depth in the physical and cognitive dimensions but faces significant limitations in the logical layer due to its dependence on digital platforms, cloud services, and artificial intelligence predominantly controlled by external actors.

Its main vulnerability is the asymmetry between regulatory capacity and technological capacity.

Recommendations directed at public policies in the sector:

- Accelerate the implementation of European digital sovereignty programs;

- Increase investments in proprietary artificial intelligence;

- Strengthen sovereign cloud computing initiatives;

- Encourage the creation of competitive European digital platforms;

- Develop advanced industrial capacity in semiconductors; and

- Expand coordinated mechanisms for cognitive defense and combating disinformation.

Brazil occupies an intermediate position, reflecting the coexistence of significant national capabilities and high external technological dependence. The country possesses relevant strategic assets, such as PIX, GOV.BR, and an advanced digital financial infrastructure, but still demonstrates significant limitations in the logical layer of cyberspace.

Its main vulnerability lies in its dependence on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, global digital platforms, and cloud computing services.

Recommendations for improving public policies in the sector:

- Develop a National Strategy for Cyber ​​Strategic Depth;

- Establish a National Policy for Technological Autonomy;

- Increase investments in artificial intelligence and advanced computing;

- Develop national semiconductor capacity;

- Strengthen innovation ecosystems and technological startups;

- Create a National Cognitive Defense Strategy;

- Institutionalize permanent digital literacy programs;

- Expand the protection of critical national infrastructures;

- Strengthen the integration between government, academia, industry, and the defense sector; e

- Expand human resource training programs in STEM areas.

The results indicate that the international system is evolving towards a power structure based on three central elements:

a. Technological autonomy – the ability to develop and control critical technologies;

b. Institutional resilience – the ability to absorb and recover from systemic shocks;

c. Cognitive defense – the ability to protect society against operations of influence and informational manipulation.

In this context, international competition tends to progressively shift towards sectors such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, autonomous systems, and control of global information flows.

Comparative analysis suggests that states that manage to integrate these capabilities into a coherent national strategy will possess higher levels of cyber strategic depth and, consequently, a greater capacity to preserve their sovereignty, their freedom of action, and their defense capabilities in the face of the transformations of the Information Age.

5.6 Scientific potential of the CSDI

The Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index (CSDI) represents one of the main contributions of the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory (CSDT), providing an operational mechanism capable of transforming a theoretical construct into an object of systematic observation, measurement, and comparison.

The scientific relevance of the CSDI stems from the fact that it allows establishing a methodological bridge between theory and empirical evidence. While the CSDT offers an explanatory model for understanding the strategic survival of States in the Information Age, the CSDI provides the necessary instruments to empirically evaluate the validity of this model.

From this perspective, the index should not be understood merely as a classification tool, but as an analytical instrument aimed at producing scientific knowledge about the international distribution of cyber and information capabilities.

Thus, the CSDI has the following scientific contributions:

- Enabling the operationalization of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth as an observable variable: Historically, concepts such as national power, sovereignty, and strategic autonomy have often been used abstractly, making their objective measurement difficult. The CSDI seeks to overcome this limitation by decomposing cyber strategic depth into specific dimensions — physical, logical, cognitive, and technological dependence — associated with observable empirical indicators.

In this way, the index transforms a theoretical category into a measurable variable, allowing different States to be evaluated according to common and comparable criteria.

This characteristic brings the CSDT closer to other consolidated traditions of International Relations, such as national power indices, governance indicators, and state capacity models used in comparative literature.

- Possibility of empirically testing the hypotheses derived from the CSDT: A scientific theory only acquires robustness when its propositions can be confronted with observable evidence. The CSDI allows us to verify, for example, whether states with greater cyber strategic depth exhibit higher levels of resilience in the face of cyberattacks, technological crises, disinformation campaigns, or disruptions to critical infrastructure.

Similarly, it makes it possible to examine whether high levels of technological dependence are associated with higher degrees of strategic vulnerability, as predicted by the theory.

By allowing the comparison between theoretical expectations and observed results, the index creates conditions for the validation, refutation, or refinement of the CSDT itself, strengthening its scientific character.

- Creation of a comparative instrument applicable to different national contexts: The CSDI allows us to assess how states position themselves in the strategic competition of the Information Age, identifying differences in capacity between technological powers, emerging economies, and developing countries.

The systematic application of the index enables the construction of international rankings, regional analyses, and longitudinal studies capable of revealing patterns of power distribution in the digital environment.

From this perspective, the CSDI contributes to the development of a new research agenda in Digital Geopolitics, allowing us to understand how cyber capabilities influence the power structure of the contemporary international system.

Furthermore, the use of the index in time series can reveal trends of ascent, stagnation, or decline in the cyber strategic depth of states over time.

- Ability to integrate different theoretical traditions often treated in isolation: The literature on digital sovereignty focuses predominantly on technological autonomy. Studies on national power emphasize material resources and state capabilities. Research on resilience analyzes the capacity for recovery in the face of crises. Studies on cyberpower investigate the capacity to produce strategic effects in the digital environment.

The CSDI offers an analytical framework capable of integrating these approaches into a single explanatory model.

In this sense, the index can contribute to the development of a new generation of interdisciplinary studies situated at the intersection of International Relations, Strategic Studies, Cybersecurity, International Political Economy, and Digital Governance.

In future research, the index could be used in multivariate statistical analyses aimed at investigating the relationship between cyber strategic depth and variables such as economic growth, technological innovation, institutional stability, international competitiveness, and power projection capacity.

Similarly, it could be used in correlation and causality studies involving digital development indicators such as cybersecurity, technological sovereignty, and national resilience.

The use of techniques such as Exploratory Factor Analysis, Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Structural Equation Modelling, and Longitudinal Panels will allow for the refinement of variable weightings and the testing of the index's internal consistency in different empirical contexts.

These procedures will contribute to transforming the CSDI from an initially theoretical instrument into a consolidated tool for international strategic analysis.

6. Case Study: Brazil And Cyber Strategic Depth

6.1 Brazil in the Information Age

Over the past two decades, Brazil has experienced an accelerated process of digital transformation. The expansion of connectivity, the digitization of public services, the modernization of the financial system, and the growing adoption of digital technologies by society have produced a profound reconfiguration of the national strategic environment.

From the perspective of the Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth, Brazil presents particularly relevant characteristics for analysis.

On the one hand, it possesses one of the largest digital markets in the world, extensive financial infrastructure, and growing scientific and technological capacity. On the other hand, it maintains a high degree of external technological dependence in sectors considered critical to national sovereignty.

This combination makes Brazil a particularly suitable case for examining the mechanisms proposed by the TCSD.

6.2 PIX as a national strategic infrastructure

The PIX represent one of the most relevant institutional and technological innovations in Brazil's recent history.

Launched by the Central Bank in 2020, the system has profoundly transformed the dynamics of national electronic payments, quickly becoming the country's main financial transaction infrastructure.

From a traditional perspective, PIX could be interpreted simply as a payment platform. However, from the perspective of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth, its relevance is much greater.

The system constitutes a critical national infrastructure. Its prolonged interruption would produce immediate impacts on:

- Economic activity;

- Tax collection;

- Banking system;

- Electronic commerce;

- Public services; and

- Social stability.

The PIX represent a concrete example of an asset belonging to the Brazilian Cyber ​​Amazon.

Its strategic importance stems not only from the volume of resources moved, but from its centrality to the functioning of the national economy. In this sense, its protection is a matter directly related to national sovereignty.

6.3 The Physical Dimension of Brazilian Strategic Depth

The analysis of the Brazilian physical dimension reveals significant advances. The country possesses:

- a wide telecommunications network;

- multiple international submarine cables;

- a large energy generation capacity;

- a growing number of data centers; and

- highly digitized financial systems.

The infrastructure that supports PIX demonstrates a high degree of operational robustness. Even in the face of usage peaks, the system maintained high levels of availability.

This performance suggests the existence of reasonable strategic depth in the physical layer. However, relevant vulnerabilities remain.

The concentration of a significant portion of the computing infrastructure in foreign cloud providers reduces national autonomy. In addition, dependence on equipment produced abroad limits the ability to respond to scenarios of disruption in global supply chains.

From the perspective of TCSD, these vulnerabilities reduce the country's physical strategic depth.

6.4 The Logical Dimension and Technological Dependence

The logical layer constitutes the main Brazilian challenge. Although the country has significant software development capacity and a dynamic technological ecosystem, a high dependence on foreign technologies is observed.

A large part of the operating systems used in critical national infrastructures are developed abroad. The main cloud computing providers belong to foreign companies. The most advanced artificial intelligence models are also predominantly produced outside the country.

This reality creates strategic vulnerabilities. In situations of international crisis, economic sanctions, or technological restrictions, the continuity of essential services can be compromised.

The case of semiconductors is particularly illustrative, insofar as the contemporary digital economy depends heavily on these components. However, Brazil has limited participation in its global production chain.

Technological dependence therefore becomes a structural factor of vulnerability.

Thus, the proposed theory argues that this dependence directly reduces the Brazilian cyber strategic depth.

One of the most relevant episodes for the validation of the theory occurred when vulnerabilities in suppliers connected to the National Financial System demonstrated the strategic importance of the digital supply chain.

The episode showed that the robustness of an infrastructure does not depend only on its core systems. It also depends on the security of the peripheral actors integrated into the ecosystem.

From the perspective of TCSD, this case reveals an important causal mechanism. The existence of strategic depth cannot be assessed solely by the protection of core assets It depends on the ability to protect the entire network of interdependencies that underpins the system's operation.

The incident demonstrated that vulnerabilities in external suppliers can compromise assets considered critical. Consequently, strategic depth must be understood as a systemic attribute and not just a sectoral one.

6.5 The Cognitive Dimension and Information Warfare

The cognitive dimension represents the most innovative contribution of the proposed theory.

In the Brazilian case, this dimension proved particularly relevant during recent episodes of disinformation related to digital infrastructures.

The campaigns involving false narratives about PIX demonstrated that cognitive operations could produce strategic effects without compromising any physical or logical component of the system. No servers were destroyed, no networks were interrupted, and no software was compromised. However, an impact on public trust was observed.

This episode confirms one of the central assumptions of the TCSD: In the Information Age, trust has become a strategic infrastructure.

The stability of digital systems depends not only on their technological security, but also on the perception of legitimacy and reliability built with the population.

Cognitive depth corresponds precisely to the ability to preserve this trust in the face of information manipulation campaigns.

Another relevant example is the GOV.BR platform. The initiative consolidated thousands of public services in a unified digital environment, significantly increasing administrative efficiency.

From the perspective of the TCSD, GOV.BR represents both an opportunity and a challenge.

Digital centralization increases operational efficiency. However, it also amplifies the strategic importance of the platform.

The greater the dependence on a single system, the greater the need for redundancy, protection, and operational continuity mechanisms.

The existence of contingency plans, alternative systems, and recovery protocols becomes a fundamental element of strategic depth.

The case shows that state digitization needs to be accompanied by the construction of resilience mechanisms.

6.6 Discussion of Brazilian results

The analysis of the Brazilian case confirms the main mechanisms predicted by the Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth.

Firstly, it demonstrates that contemporary strategic survival depends on capabilities distributed across different layers of cyberspace. Secondly, it shows that technological dependence is a limiting factor for national autonomy. Finally, it confirms that the cognitive dimension has become an indispensable component of strategic security.

The Brazilian case suggests that the greatest challenges to building cyber strategic depth are not necessarily in physical infrastructure, but in strengthening technological autonomy and cognitive resilience.

These results offer preliminary evidence supporting the central hypothesis of the research and demonstrate the applicability of TCSD as an instrument for analyzing sovereignty and strategic survival in the Information Age.

7. Discussion

The results obtained throughout this investigation suggest that the digital transformation of societies has produced a structural change in the foundations of the strategic survival of states. Although the principles formulated by classical Geopolitics remain relevant, the analysis developed indicates that the capacity to absorb threats no longer depends exclusively on territorial depth and has increasingly involved the depth of national informational ecosystems.

Historically, strategic depth has been associated with geography. State survival was favored by the existence of vast territories, natural barriers, and the ability to disperse centers of power. This logic remained valid for much of modern history and profoundly influenced Western strategic thinking.

However, the cases analyzed demonstrate that physical distance no longer constitutes sufficient protection against contemporary threats.

A cyberattack targeting financial systems, power grids, or government infrastructure can produce immediate effects, regardless of the attacker's geographic location.

In this context, the Theory of Cyber ​​Strategic Depth does not replace classical Geopolitics. Conversely, it expands its assumptions to an environment characterized by the increasing centrality of information.

The theory's main contribution is to shift the concept of strategic depth from physical space to functional space. The fundamental strategic question ceases to be:

"What is the distance between the threat and the centers of power?" and becomes: "How many layers of protection, autonomy, redundancy, and resilience exist between the threat and the capacity to produce systemic damage?"

This change represents a significant conceptual expansion of the classical theory of strategic depth.

Another relevant result of the research refers to the integration between the literatures on cyber sovereignty and national resilience.

The systematic review demonstrated that these two theoretical currents evolved relatively independently.

The literature on cyber sovereignty has focused on the state's ability to control the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace. In turn, studies on national resilience have emphasized the ability of systems to absorb and recover from shocks.

The analysis developed in this article suggests that these two perspectives are complementary.

Sovereignty without strategic depth produces vulnerable systems. Similarly, resilience without technological autonomy tends to present structural limitations.

The TCSD proposes precisely the integration of these two fields. From this perspective, cyber strategic depth can be understood as the mechanism that connects sovereignty and resilience.

The greater the depth in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers, the greater the capacity to preserve sovereignty in the face of crises and attacks.

This interpretation broadens the traditional understanding of national security and offers a more appropriate approach to the characteristics of the Information Age.

Another relevant point is that the research results indicate that the main theoretical innovation of the TCSD lies in the incorporation of the cognitive dimension as a structuring component of strategic depth.

Historically, strategic studies have focused predominantly on material resources. Territory, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, and military power constituted the main indicators used to assess the relative position of states.

The analysis of contemporary cases suggests that this approach has become insufficient. Episodes involving disinformation campaigns, influence operations, and cognitive warfare demonstrate that contemporary strategic disputes increasingly occur in the realm of perceptions.

The stability of digital systems depends not only on their technological robustness, but also on the social trust that underpins their operation.

The Brazilian case involving false narratives related to PIX illustrates this phenomenon. No infrastructure was physically attacked; no logical system was compromised. Even so, a strategic impact was observed resulting from the attempt to influence collective perceptions.

This phenomenon suggests that trust has become a strategic resource.

Consequently, the ability to preserve the integrity of the cognitive environment emerges as a central element of contemporary sovereignty. TCSD proposes that cognitive depth constitutes a specific form of strategic depth.

This formulation represents an original contribution to the international literature on digital security and sovereignty.

International comparative analysis revealed that technological dependence constitutes one of the main explanatory factors for the differences observed between the levels of profundity Strategic informational independence.

The cases of the United States and China demonstrate that high levels of technological autonomy tend to produce higher levels of strategic depth.

On the other hand, the cases of the European Union and Brazil highlight the challenges associated with dependence on externally developed platforms, semiconductors, cloud services, and artificial intelligence systems.

This result confirms one of the central hypotheses of the theory. In the Information Age, technological dependence plays a role like that played by energy or logistics dependencies in previous periods. It creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited in contexts of geopolitical competition.

Consequently, technological autonomy emerges as an essential component of strategic survival.

The contribution of the TCSD consists of explicitly incorporating this variable into the analytical model through the concept of External Technological Dependence (TD).

This inclusion allows us to understand why states with similar levels of economic development may exhibit distinct capacities for strategic resilience.

7.1 The CSDI and the operationalization of the theory

One of the central challenges faced by contemporary theories of digital sovereignty lies in the difficulty of transforming abstract concepts into empirically verifiable instruments.

In this respect, the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Index represents a relevant methodological contribution.

By operationalizing the physical, logical, cognitive, and technological dependence dimensions, the index allows the theory to be converted into an analytical tool capable of international comparison.

Although the application carried out in this study has an exploratory character, the results suggest that the CSDI has potential for future quantitative research.

Its use may allow longitudinal comparisons; regional analyses; correlation studies; construction of international rankings; and the evaluation of public policies.

In this way, the TCSD goes beyond conceptual formulation and offers concrete mechanisms for its empirical validation.

Its main theoretical implication refers to the need to reformulate the classic concepts used to understand power and sovereignty in the 21st century.

The analysis suggests that the strategic survival of states increasingly depends on their ability to build depth in informational environments.

This finding has implications for different areas of knowledge.

For Geopolitics, it means recognizing that the digital space has become a permanent component of international competition. In relation to Strategic Studies, it implies expanding the concept of strategic depth beyond the territorial dimension. Within National Security, it requires incorporating the protection of informational ecosystems as a priority strategic objective. In the formulation of public policies, it reinforces the importance of investments in technological autonomy, digital education, and cognitive defense.

In this sense, the TCSD offers a conceptual framework capable of integrating these different dimensions into a single explanatory model.

The results obtained have important implications for public policy makers.

The theory suggests that building sovereignty in the Information Age requires simultaneous policies on three fronts.

Strengthening the Physical Layer: States must expand the protection of critical infrastructures; data centers; energy systems; telecommunications networks; and submarine cables. The redundancy of these infrastructures becomes a central element of national security. Strengthening the Logical Layer: Reducing technological dependence requires investments in research and development; strengthening the national software industry; developing artificial intelligence; and expanding national capacity in semiconductors. Technological autonomy becomes a long-term strategic issue.

Strengthening the Cognitive Layer: The results suggest that digital literacy programs; technological education; combating disinformation; and cognitive defense should be incorporated into national security policies. Protecting society against influence operations becomes a component of national defense.

7.2 Limitations and robustness of the theory

Despite the promising results, the proposed theory has limitations that must be recognized.

Firstly, it is an initial formulation that needs extensive empirical validation.

The application of CSDI was carried out in an exploratory manner and should be refined using standardized international databases. In addition, rapid technological evolution may require future adaptations of the model.

New technologies, such as quantum computing, artificial general intelligence, and advanced autonomous systems, could significantly alter the dynamics of strategic informational depth. However, these limitations do not diminish the relevance of the contribution presented. On the contrary, they indicate the existence of a broad and promising research agenda.

The theory's ability to integrate concepts from Geopolitics, Cyber ​​Sovereignty, National Resilience, and Digital Security suggests high explanatory potential.

8. Conclusions

The digital transformation of contemporary societies has produced a structural change in the foundations of sovereignty, national security, and international competition. Throughout modern history, the survival capacity of states has been strongly associated with geography and territorial depth. The extent of the territory, the presence of natural barriers, and the distance between borders and vital centers of power constituted central elements of strategic security.

However, the consolidation of the Information Age has profoundly altered this reality.

The increasing dependence on digital infrastructures, computer systems, artificial intelligence, technological platforms, and global information flows has reduced the relative relevance of geographical distance and amplified the importance of informational ecosystems as central spaces for the struggle for power.

Starting from this context, this research sought to answer the following question:

How do states preserve their strategic autonomy in an environment characterized by increasing digital dependence and the reduced relevance of geographical distance?

The proposed response was formulated using the Cyber ​​Strategic Depth Theory (CSDT).

The theory argues that the strategic survival of states in the 21st century depends on their ability to build depth in the physical, logical, and cognitive layers of cyberspace, while simultaneously reducing their external technological dependence.

This formulation allowed for the expansion of the classic concept of strategic depth beyond the territorial dimension, incorporating the specificities of the Information Age.

The research demonstrated that the specialized literature presents important contributions on Geopolitics, National Resilience, Cyber ​​Power, Digital Sovereignty, and Cyber ​​Sovereignty. However, a theoretical gap was identified related to the absence of a model capable of explaining how states build strategic depth in their informational ecosystems.

CSDT was developed precisely to fill this gap.

From a conceptual point of view, the theory defined strategic informational depth as the capacity of a State to absorb, resist, adapt to, and recover from threats directed at its strategic informational ecosystem, preserving its decisional autonomy, freedom of action, and continuity in the exercise of National Power.

This definition allowed the focus of strategic analysis to shift from geographic space to functional space.

Instead of measuring security by the physical distance between threat and target, the theory proposes evaluating the number of layers of protection, redundancy, autonomy, and resilience that exist between a threat and its capacity to produce systemic damage.

The research also demonstrated that contemporary strategic depth is built upon three fundamental dimensions.

The first corresponds to the physical layer, composed of the material infrastructures that support the functioning of cyberspace. The second refers to the logical layer, consisting of the systems, algorithms, software, and technologies responsible for information processing. The third corresponds to the cognitive layer, represented by the perceptions, behaviors, values, and decision-making processes that influence the stability of contemporary societies.

Among these three dimensions, the research identified the cognitive layer as one of the main analytical innovations of the theory.

The case studies analysed demonstrated that contemporary conflicts are not limited to the destruction of infrastructure or the disruption of digital systems. Increasingly, they seek to influence perceptions, alter behaviors, and compromise public trust.

In this context, the ability to resist informational manipulation becomes an essential component of sovereignty.

Another relevant contribution of the research was the incorporation of External Technological Dependence as a central explanatory variable.

The results obtained indicate that technological autonomy constitutes one of the main determinants of informational strategic depth.

States that are excessively dependent on platforms, semiconductors, operating systems, artificial intelligence, or cloud computing services controlled by external actors tend to exhibit greater strategic vulnerability.

The comparative analysis of the cases of the United States, China, Estonia, the European Union, and Brazil reinforced this conclusion.

Countries that exhibit higher levels of technological autonomy also tend to exhibit higher levels of informational strategic depth.

In terms of methodology, the research sought to move beyond conceptual formulation by creating the Cybernetic Strategic Depth Index (CSDI).

This instrument was designed to allow the empirical operationalization of the theory, transforming abstract concepts into variables that can be observed and compared the measurement and measurement.

Although its application in this study is exploratory in nature, CSDI offers promising bases for future quantitative and comparative investigations.

The Brazilian case study demonstrated the practical utility of the theory.

The analysis of the PIX ecosystem, the GOV.BR platform, and national cybersecurity initiatives revealed that contemporary strategic depth depends simultaneously on technological robustness, digital autonomy, and social trust.

The Brazilian case showed that the main challenges for expanding national strategic depth are not only found in physical infrastructure, but mainly in reducing external technological dependence and strengthening cognitive resilience.

The results obtained also allowed the formulation of the Law of Informational Strategic Depth:

The strategic survival capacity of a State in the Information Age is directly proportional to the degree of depth existing in its physical, logical, and cognitive layers and inversely proportional to its external technological dependence.

This proposition synthesizes the explanatory core of the theory and offers a general principle for understanding sovereignty and strategic competition in the 21st century.

In terms of scientific contribution, the research produced five main advances.

First, it broadened the classic concept of strategic depth to the context of the Information Age. Second, it integrated the literatures of Geopolitics, National Resilience, Cyber ​​Power, and Cyber ​​Sovereignty into a single analytical framework. Third, it incorporated the cognitive dimension as a central component of strategic survival. Fourth, it introduced technological dependence as an explanatory variable of state vulnerability.

Finally, it developed an index for the empirical operationalization of the theory.

Naturally, the research has limitations.

The main one refers to the initial nature of the proposed formulation.

The CSDT needs to be subjected to additional empirical tests involving different national contexts and broader historical series.

Similarly, the CSDI should be refined using international databases and advanced statistical techniques.

These limitations, however, do not reduce the relevance of the contribution presented.

On the contrary, they highlight the existence of a broad and promising research agenda.

Future studies could develop comparative analyses involving a larger number of countries, investigate the relationship between informational strategic depth and national power, improve the CSDI indicators, and examine the impacts of emerging technologies such as advanced artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and autonomous systems.

It is concluded, therefore, that the Theory of Cybernetic Strategic Depth offers a new conceptual framework for understanding the challenges of sovereignty and state survival in the Information Age.

Just as classical Geopolitics sought to explain the relationship between power and territory in the Industrial Age, the CSDT seeks to explain the relationship between power, information, and resilience in the 21st century.

In a world increasingly dependent on digital systems, information flows, and critical technologies, informational strategic depth tends to become one of the main determinants of the autonomy, security, and power of states.

In this sense, the CSDT presents itself not only as a theoretical proposal but as a new analytical paradigm for Strategic Studies of the Information Age.

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Author details
Wanderlino Moreno Junior
Brazilian Army, Master
✉ Corresponding Author
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